mills

My name is Mills Baker; I write about love, culture, art, religion, mental illness, philosophy, memory, politics and the rather random.

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Posts tagged psychology.
“My formula for human greatness is amor fati: that one wants to have nothing different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity. Not merely to bear the necessary, still less to conceal it—all idealism is mendaciousness before the necessary—but to love it.”

A syphilitic Friedrich Nietzsche in the chapter of Ecce Homo titled “Why I am so Clever,” though I should add that this is an example of an idea -amor fati- not without its value despite the increasing dementia of its author. I came across it again while reading Wikipedia’s brief treatment of Nietzsche’s comments concerning eternal return, which related to the previous post.

That idea is probably familiar to most from Kundera’s The Unbearable Lightness of Being, which questions at its outset whether the lightness of an existence that vanishes irretrievably into the past is terrible or fortunate; would it better for everything that happens to happen eternally, so to speak?

It’s worth noting that physicists would dispute the assumptions these questions make about time; the great Unburying the Lead quoted Albert Einstein recently:“For those of us who believe in physics, this separation between past, present and future is only an illusion.”

Update: Nick Barr noted that “the whole syphilis thing is probably untrue,” an assertion which surprised me as the last time I read Nietzsche it seemed fairly widely accepted; much of his lifelong medical trouble is explained by such a diagnosis. But Barr has scholarship on his side, and I thank him for the correction; it appears now to at least be again in dispute, and strong arguments against syphilis have been made.

“His mind was too active to be an accurate receiver. What he thought he had heard was never exactly what you had said.”

C.S. Lewis on his father, who I want to make clear was in this respect not at all like my own. This description, Abby would be glad to tell you, applies more to my egregious imbalance between restless mental activity and inattention.

But I think it’s a very good point: there is a connection between activity and reception in the mind. I never remember anything but am always thinking, generally quite uselessly but sometimes profitably; my memory, on the other hand, is the worst of anyone I know, and has actually grown faultier as I’ve grown more distracted in keeping with the times. I can feel my memory improving whenever I am away from civilization for a spell, away from the web in particular.

As a contrast, I never hear Will babbling or pondering the sort of imbecilic minutiae which make up my internal monologue, and he remembers everything.

Birthdays and Joy

Today is my wonderful father’s birthday; it is also Paul’s; it is also the anniversary of Kristallnacht and of the fall of the Berlin Wall. Does anyone know how precisely –if at all- the Earth is in the same position relative to the sun in successive years on a given date?

My father has given me a great deal, and I’ve taken even more from him, particularly materially. One of my favorite gifts from him was C.S. Lewis’ marvelous autobiography of youth, Surprised by Joy, which explores a sensation the pursuit of which was to guide Lewis’ life.

By Joy, Lewis means a precise phenomenon which is by its nature indescribable directly; I often think of it as a kind of profoundly asymptotic experience, profound because all reality, all contact, all intellection is in some senses asymptotic; the asymptote is a metaphor I think of often. Lewis says Joy is “an unsatisfied desire which itself is more desirable than any other satisfaction.” He continues:

“Joy…is here a technical term and must be distinguished from both happiness and pleasure. Joy has indeed one characteristic, and one only, in common with them; the fact that anyone who has experienced it will want it again. Apart from that…it might almost equally well be called a particular kind of unhappiness or grief. But then it is a kind we want. I doubt whether anyone who has tasted it would ever…exchange it for all the pleasures in the world. But then Joy is never in our power and pleasure often is.”

Joy is, for Lewis, most often brought about in contemplation of certain worlds, particularly in childhood, and I think it is most universally understood in that way: think of those worlds, those spaces you adored or considered magical in your youth. Perhaps it was a shed in which you played with a friend in which the sun though a small window illuminated the suspension of dust and made it appear that there was a wall of light. Perhaps it was the universe of a favorite children’s book, the illustrated rooms of which seemed rich in depth, every detail en enormity.

Perhaps it was even more vague; Lewis recalls the stirring of Joy when reading a poem:“I desired, with almost sickening intensity something never to be described (except that it is cold, spacious, severe, pale, and remote,” and later relates the development of his interest in Norse mythology to this resonance.

The frequency with which I’ve felt Joy has varied greatly; I anxiously worry that my medicines stifle it, but I have come to feel that it is actually ineluctable if one has any life of imagination at all. I feel that it is, in fact, a kind of barometer of my internal world. But it is rare, rarer than anything else I experience.

Lewis writes that “All Joy reminds. It is never a possession, always a desire for something longer ago or further away or still ‘about to be.’” In his life, the catalyst for Joy changed greatly over time and eventually became religious; indeed, there is much in the perpetually anticipatory, asymptotic, ungraspable, unspeakable quality of Joy that reminds one of various mysticisms, particularly of the East. But it is universal, I think; it is what sets us wandering in childhood, searching for beauty less of a formal than an emotional sort.

I’d never known that anyone else felt it before I read Surprised by Joy, and I can thank my dad for bringing awareness of it to me; he has done so with so many things I treasure over the course of my life that I could never repay him. Neither could I repay him all the money I’ve taken, but I think the former debt is the more significant.

“If the rule you followed brought you to this, of what use was the rule?”

Anton Chigurh in No Country for Old Men. Is a rule’s value to be found in its praxis? And since no rule can keep hardship, tragedy, or death away, is any rule “of use”? And what sort of rule might Chigurh mean? Can some rules accomplish a delivery, by transcendence rather than avoidance, from the sorrow and violence of ordinary life? Are those rules “of use”? What is the difference between transcendence and flight?

Does everyone’s life unfold according to implicit rules? Does it matter whether one understands the rules -or single unifying rule- according to which one lives?

“We, amnesiacs all, condemned to live in an eternally fleeting present, have created the most elaborate of human constructions, memory, to buffer ourselves against the intolerable knowledge of the irreversible passage of time and the irretrieveability of its moments and events.”
“Display of superior knowledge is as great a vulgarity as display of superior wealth — greater indeed, inasmuch as knowledge should tend more definitely than wealth towards discretion and good manners.”

Henry Fowler, the lexicographer best known for A Dictionary of Modern English Usage. David Foster Wallace, in his evidently quite-flawed essay “Tense Present,” described Fowler thusly:

If Samuel Johnson is the Shakespeare of English usage, think of Henry Watson Fowler as the Eliot or Joyce. His 1926 A Dictionary of Modern English Usage is the granddaddy of modern usage guides, and its dust-dry wit and blushless imperiousness have been models for every subsequent classic in the field…

What interests me about Fowler’s claim is that I am often amused by the veneration of intelligence in the same communities that deplore the veneration of beauty or wealth, since intelligence is no less arbitrary in allotment, constructed in classification, and happenstance in appearance than those attributes. Indeed, it involves as many attendant flaws as they do, too: often, wit entails derision; brilliance, arrogance; knowledge, pedantic elitism.

Simen commented recently on the inequality of beauty, a fact which problematizes even the most pleasant utopias; those who hope to maintain in the face of the irresolvable unfairness of beauty’s inequitable distribution the plausibility of a fair society will have to claim that beauty is a fluid concept we can redefine, that it only matters because of the patriarchy or advertising, or some such idea reducing its import. I’ve long wondered what egalitarian revolutionaries propose to do about nature’s individuated and unequal distribution of attractiveness.

And what of intelligence? I believe intelligence is no more laudable than athleticism, morally; it makes one good at some things and not at others. It is not a moral virtue; it is not a mark of goodness; someone cannot be faulted for not possessing it; and Fowler is right: we should regard the display of knowledge as comparably vulgar to material ostentation.

Or is this not the case? Is there some quality to intelligence which distinguishes it from beauty, speed, height? Is there a connection, in theory or in fact, between intelligence and goodness (should there be such a thing)? Does it relate to this characteristic of mind?

Metaphors and Dreams

Apropos of this fine post by Chris, a comment from Meaghano, the work of Julian Jaynes, and earlier discussions about metaphors:

I’ve briefly referred to the argument that all thought is structurally metaphorical, that the human mind with its linguistic faculties is essentially a machine for making metaphors of the natural world. This argument claims that our method for apprehending reality is to mentally relate novel phenomena, by metaphor, to known phenomena. Chris quite cleverly noted that, in this sense, “poetic psychology,” or the idea of investigating psychology by detailing and deconstructing a person’s metaphors, is a tautology. Quite so!

Psychology does examine metaphors seriously in one sense: dream analysis. Dreams are rather like odd metaphors run amok, representing people, sensations, and problems in our lives in confusing ways. Their code is complex but it has meaning, and what strikes me now is that the language of dreams seems almost as though it is made of poetic metaphors created by someone else to explain the phenomena of our lives. Thus dreams are like the opposite of conscious thought.

That is to say: if an ordinary metaphor is a means of explaining an less familiar metaphrand by a more familiar, descriptive, or explanatory metaphier we can examine the metaphor by who creates it and why it illuminates the subject for them. But a dream metaphor is in some ways opaque even to its ostensible creator, unless he learns an external science for its decoding.

I dream of a house flooding with water, and no matter how I try to secure the doors or bail out the waters their level continues to rise. I don’t know what this means until my psychiatrist tells me, which means I have attempted to illuminate a known metaphrand –the phenomena of my life, observed and felt by me- with an unknown metaphier! It is as though I’ve written a poem I cannot understand but which contains intelligible, intentional, and coherent symbols.

In this sense, dreams are an inversion of the normative process of cognition. They take what we know ordinarily and represent it to us with metaphors that are not nonsensical but are personally mysterious, as though there is a mischievous surrealist defamiliarizing my life every night for reasons I don’t fully understand.

“…the train pulled into Heidelberg station, where there were so many people crowding the platforms that I feared they were fleeing from a city doomed or already laid waste.”

W.G. Sebald, Vertigo. Sebald’s novels, it is said, are thematically haunted by the Holocaust even when they do not overtly treat it as a subject. It is perhaps true as well that the Holocaust haunts his novels because as the destruction of a culture and its memory par excellence it exemplifies his real thematic obsession: memory and its disappearance.

That said, the sentence quoted above is exemplary of his style: an ordinary observation of a European scene imbued metaphorically with sorrow or horror. As I read it, I thought of how uniquely we are marked by our metaphors, or by their absence.

When you see a crowded train platform, what do you see?

  • “…people…fleeing from a city doomed or already laid waste”?
  • Enthusiastic moshers heaving to some thrumming cacophony?
  • A scarcely distinguishable mass of froth and scum?
  • The long-sought crowd into which you can disappear?
  • Enormous atoms in a kind of Brownian motion?
  • The lonely wanderers of urban life as painted by George Tooker?

Probably something else yet: the process of metaphor-making, which can be rather automatic, is a highly individual one, as one learns in childhood when one describes clouds with a friend: dinosaurs, cars, houses, letters. The last point in the list is notable: when one sees Tooker’s work, it affects one’s metaphor-making dramatically, a process described in this lovely quote posted by Meaghano.

How creative one’s metaphors are varies, but so too does one’s instinct towards metaphorical thought. I imagine many think not of imagery but of description: all these people! Or analysis: it must be rush hour, or perhaps a station is closed. Or some combination, etc.

In Immortality, Milan Kundera says he would like

“…an experiment that would examine, by means of electrodes attached to a human head, exactly how much of one’s life a person devotes to the present, how much to memories, and how much to the future. This would let us know who a man really is in relation to his time. What human time really is. And we could surely define three basic types of human being depending on which variety of time was dominant…”

He calls this a form of the aforementioned “existential mathematics.” I would like a poetic psychology which could class humans by their instinct for metaphors, how variegated and constant it is, and whether it delights or upsets them. Surely for every metaphor that amuses or engages there is one, like Sebald’s, that disturbs or discomfits, triggering through the imagination a panic attack or despair.

“There is a secret bond between slowness and memory, between speed and forgetting. Consider this utterly commonplace situation: a man is walking down the street. At a certain moment, he tries to recall something, but the recollection escapes him. Automatically he slows down. Meanwhile, a person who wants to forget a disagreeable incident he has just lived through starts unconsciously to speed up his pace, as if he were trying to distance himself from a thing still too close to him in time. In existential mathematics, that experience takes the form of two basic equations: the degree of slowness is directly proportional to the intensity of memory; the degree of speed is directly proportional to the intensity of forgetting.”
Milan Kundera, Slowness.

A Hierarchy of Differences

Someone I admire very much noted that when he meets someone, he categorizes their differences from him -“subconsciously,” without willing to do so- hierarchically:

  1. Sex
  2. Age
  3. Socioeconomic status
  4. Nationality
  5. Race

He writes that “if meeting a new person [he is] more conscious of the fact that she is a female than the fact that she is from [another country,” to take an example. I suspect that we all so-categorize, although I should emphasize that we might do so without judgment or prejudice (to any substantive degree); and we might most easily detect how we do so in our automatically-adopted postures, diction, tone, and attitudes. Around the elderly, we perhaps curse less; around the opposite sex, we perhaps are more nervous. Around the very poor, perhaps we’d not mention our blogs or iPhones.

I don’t wish to ask the rather political question of whether we consider new individuals categorically or not, as I consider it a probable fact of human nature that where we are aware of categories we use them to sort experiences, without malice. The struggle against bad categorical thought is as much about choosing categories we feel are just and useful as about erasing categories entirely. Of course, it is always best to consider individuals as individuals; and we do so once we know someone well.

Rather, my question is: What is your hierarchy? Is sex commonly first, for example, or is socioeconomic status more notable? Or does your hierarchy change contextually?

“As for the natural faculties within me, of which my writing is proof, I feel them bending under the burden. My ideas and my judgment merely grope their way forward, faltering, tripping, and stumbling; and when I have advanced as far as I can…I can see more country ahead, but with so disturbed and clouded a vision that I can distinguish nothing. Then I realize how weak and poor, how heavy and lifeless I am, in comparison with [real authors], and feel pity and contempt for myself.”

Montaigne, uncontested genius and inventor of the essay, in a typical passage critiquing his stupidity and ignorance. I do not compare myself to him when I note that his complaint struck me as familiar, despite the esteem in which he was held. It reminded me of Nudawn’s description of me, which Sydney and others (and I) found amusing.

This thought has occupied me for some time: why is it that I am certain of my detestability, incompetence, fraudulence, and stupidity even when others generously compliment me? I feel ashamed of this arrogance: why should I ignore their kindness? Were they to recommend a writer to me, I’d be ecstatic; but if they recommend me to myself, I think merely that they are inexplicably mistaken.

Of course there are basic psychological reasons for insecurity, which are universal enough to be uninteresting; beyond those, a few points occur to me:

  1. Consider the ubiquity of quotes concerning ignorance: we hear often that the intelligence to which we aspire consists of knowing that you know little. I know I know very little, less even than I appear to, and much of that knowledge is debatable, wrong, predicated on what I want to believe.
  2. To whom do we compare ourselves? I do not look at my middling photography and think, “Well, this is better than what I did five years ago.” Perhaps I should. Instead, I think: this is not as good as what Riaz makes; this is inferior to nearly everything I like to see; this is not what I wanted it to be. It is the same with my writing, my conversation, my appearance, my habits. How could it be otherwise? Compared to our idols or our ideated paradigms, don’t we all seem rather silly?
  3. I fear I know what drives my creativity: the desire for affection, for reassurance, for the externalization of an imagined beauty I can conjure but not exemplify, dream but not embody. How satisfied can one be with what one makes when it is merely a screen for what one wants? A personality is an assembly of coping mechanisms, and creativity is an expression of their deformation, it sometimes seems.

Lately, I have been interested in how impermeable our senses of self are, how resistant they are to praise. When people compliment me, I enjoy perhaps a few moments of elevated glee and then a sense of gratitude and happiness: happiness that we should labor to find nice things in one another, happiness that we search our peers for things to praise. In other words: my sense of self remains the same, but my impression of others improves.

That’s its own sort of gift, of course, one I think more valuable than a change in one’s conception of oneself, which, in the end, matters less than I used to think.

“Kierkegaard had no easy idea of what ‘health’ is. But he knew what it was not: it was not normal adjustment –anything but that, as he has taken excruciating analytical pains to show us. To be a ‘normal cultural man’ is, for Kierkegaard, to be sick –whether one knows it or not: ‘There is such a thing as fictitious health.’ Nietzsche later put the same thought: ‘Are there perhaps…neuroses of health?’”

Earnest Becker, in one of my favorite books. The answer to Nietzsche’s question is clear: yes, there are neuroses of health. The acquisitive and organizational urge run amok that defines consumerism, for example; or the preoccupation with a plastic aesthetic over the corporeal, with its attendant concealment of pores, sweat, hair, anything organic and unruly; or the obsession with cheeriness that makes self-esteem, a low sort of self-satisfaction, into a virtue without which one might as well be naked.

There are as many neuroses of health as there are neuroses of illness. What we must use, then, to define real mental illness, as opposed to simply characteristics that are socially undesirable, is this question: does the quality or behavior interfere with the individual’s ability to freely self-determine, to create himself as he wishes?

“Scilicet ultima semper expectanda dies homini est, dicique beatus ante obitum nemo supremaque funera debet.”

Ovid, Metamorphoses, III, quoted by Montaigne. To my knowledge, this is the only Ovid quoted by Tom Waits.

One should always wait till a man’s last day, and never call him happy before his death and funeral.

Montaigne expands on this assertion by citing historical reversals of fortune: instances in which someone’s happy life is upended by tragedy and disaster and their final years are spent imprisoned, enslaved, impoverished.

There is something peculiar in this, though, for one might ask why the first sixty happy years of a man’s life wouldn’t handily outweigh the last miserable ten. This falls into the category of existential mathematics: in considering the past, present, and future, or the phases of a life, where do we assign the weight of our calculations?

What matters: the happiness of childhood or the anguish of adolescence? Are we happy now or only in some summation of biography? If happiness is of the moment, can a reckoning be cumulative?

The plain fact: I could not say if I have been happy in this sense; I don’t know; I feel as though I’ve been happy, but part of happiness is that one’s creaking memorial apparatus shuts off and one abandons oneself to the joy of the moment; one remembers pain better, and for good reason. Sometimes I think I’ve never been happy.

In another, darker sense this argument now seems odd: in the developed world, those of us who do not die by accident or violence will die in a manner as gradual and unhappy as can be imagined. If one leads a life of success and contentment, if such a thing is possible, but spends the last decade of it forgetting oneself, losing one’s memories to gray mist, losing one’s loved one’s to the void and nullity of dementia, losing one’s physical autonomy, losing everything one wanted to be, can we say one was happy?

Would Ovid or Montaigne feel that our prolonged deaths negate the happiness of our lives? Whom would they call happy at his funeral?

“We can only learn to love by loving.”
Iris Murdoch, quoted by Frederick Woodruff. Murdoch is also responsible for what I believe is one of the greatest synopses of philosophy and psychology I’ve read.
“By default the mind is determined to find an external order with which it will meaningfully interact. Whenever I, whoever I am in relation to this mind, get small glimpses of the possible extent of the randomness and meaninglessness of the world and my ultimate isolation in it, it cripples me. I have to drag my mind and body through the world, pulling in pieces of the world, until some interesting pattern inspires the momentum that makes this movement effortless and self sustaining… I suspect that some people can continue to function while keeping this meaninglessness constantly present, but I don’t think I have met any of them. Have you? Is this the goal or the end of goals? I know that place with its absence of meaning exists in me, but for now I step carefully around it. When I stumble into it, I am never certain I will get back out again”
An amazing comment posted by Mumblelard in response to this.