mills

My name is Mills Baker; I write about love, culture, art, religion, mental illness, philosophy, memory, politics and the rather random.

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Posts tagged morality.
“Neither a pathology nor an index of moral default, stupidity is nonetheless linked to the most dangerous failures of human endeavor.”

Avital Ronell. Is she right? Remember: both knowledgeability and intelligence have willed and unwilled components (including: genetics, class, development, luck). If intelligence has a moral quality because of its impact on the participatory polity, then stupidity is a moral lapse due to its effects.

This means that whether stupidity is “willed” or not, whether it is the result of developmental aberrations or a lack of access to education or a lazy preference for partying or a poverty of inspiration or a resentful incuriosity, its negative impact on the public good makes it immoral. Whom shall we blame, morally, for stupidity?

Ronell includes in that paragraph, from her book Stupidity, a mention of Hannah Arendt’s frustrated effort to determine how stupid Adolf Eichmann was and what the effect of that stupidity really was on his deeds. The effort to assess how error affects “the most dangerous failures of human endeavor” reminds me of my favorite Errol Morris quote: “Error is the central feature of human existence.”

Errol Morris asserts, and I believe, that intelligence offers only very flimsy protection from error; I see much historical and contemporary evidence that it is nearly as likely -in some of its contortions, likelier- than stupidity to produce disaster.

Attention and Charity: 15,000 x $.10 = $1500

(Note: because I’m an idiot, the original post contained a mathematical error which was, sadly, not a typo! Thank you to those of you who noted this! Let me add an additional question: does the sum donated change the analysis below? If it were $150 for 15,000 reblogs would it be more, less, or as meaningful as if it were $15 million for 15,000 reblogs?)

Is the following proposition ethical: For everyone who deletes their reblog of the previous charity offer and instead reblogs this, I will donate $.20 to the same charity (which -at the present rate- would cost me perhaps $3000 for rather massive exposure).

Objections to this offer:

(1) It is self-aggrandizing and self-promoting. Of course, this is true of the original offer as well, which features a URL in its image for a reason; the poster might just as easily have donated $1500 to the charity in question, but by making an event of it she accumulates attention, which has actual and potential value.

Thus: I am no guiltier of this than she; if self-promotion or self-satisfaction disqualifies charity -and this is a rather old question- we are both guilty for exchanging attention (and esteem) for material wealth. This is common in philanthropy: one gets one’s name on the building, one’s photo in the paper, and so on. If it is not objectionable in ordinary circumstances, what makes it so here?

(It is probable that all she really wanted was to have a bit of fun as she did something good, which I should stress is, to me, commendable).

(2) This erases another’s charity instead of supplementing it. When I saw the original offer, I thought: what would happen if I were right now to pose the same offer for another charity? Wouldn’t I be ignored as an absurd epigone? Yes, and that’s because this community cannot pay its attention (again, attention is a scarce commodity) to dozens of charity offers daily or weekly.

If I want to make a difference, and acquire attention, I cannot merely repeat her gesture; I must displace hers. In allocating attention, we focus on what demands it; this is why our media all attend to the outrageous, the controversial, and the extraordinary. This distorts our sense of reality, of course, but scarce commodities accumulate around what takes them. Hence: shameless celebrity behavior. What is unnoticed is irrelevant to a mediated reality.

Besides: it is ostensibly the case that what matters here is the charity, and my offer means twice as much money for that cause. Aren’t other considerations about attention, credit, Tumblarity, and so on merely vulgar distractions?

(3) This is mean. The person making the original offer is quite clearly a kind, benevolent, good-hearted person whose post will mean money for a cause none can oppose. It is unpleasant to interrogate such gestures -the greening of our avatars in support of Iran, the placing of bumper stickers on our cars to combat racism, the donating of money to one cause when another is more dire by this or that metric, in which most of us -myself included- participate.

But I surely cannot have been the only one to wonder about the exchange rate -$1500 for 15,000 reblogs- or the implicit values traded in such acts of philanthropy, or other associated issues of intent, attention-scarcity, charity prioritization, and more. Indeed, if I was I am sure that only demonstrates my own moral poverty and will be something you can pity, rather than rage at, I hope.

Comments? Thoughts? Is my hypothetical proposition ethical, and if not, why not? Is this the sort of issue one should simply not discuss, instead applauding any and all good deeds without questioning their motives or incidental consequences?

“If only there were evil people somewhere insidiously committing evil deeds and it were necessary only to separate them from the rest of us and destroy them. But the line dividing good and evil cuts through the heart of every human being. And who is willing to destroy a piece of his own heart?”
Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who knew about evil, expressing what I consider an axiom of realist morality to be believed even when one perceives evil in a group as surely as one perceives light. (From Self Doubt)

Nil nisi bonum de mortuis dicere.

Error led to death. You stand, wet and cold, in the dark under the endless night sky, straining to catch your breath: you have killed her, you have killed her, you have killed her. Hear the water’s sounds against the bridge and imagine the car beneath the surface: it must be black in the depths. You will not go to jail, but in this mistake -this accidental, unwilled moment- you have drowned not only an innocent but also the dreams of your father and assassinated brothers.

They are dead, the men who shaped you. And now she is likely dead as well, as are your ambitions, which were pure -pure enough for government work, as they say. Shaking, you begin to walk: you need to think, need to speak to trusted confidantes, need time to determine how best to deal with this disaster-

-and the howl of the trauma breaks into your rational monologue, a scream of guilt and terror: the world will judge you; you killed her; you didn’t mean to; she was lovely; it was an accident-

You walk past homes: no, you cannot knock on these doors. Feel the hand that would summon help in your wet hair: this is how her hair felt, or would have felt if you’d gotten around to running your fingers through it; and it is how your wife’s hair feels. Goddamn all this: all this for lust, or do you still believe you offered her a ride for politeness?

-of course! It was nothing: just being a gentleman, the testimony of that deputy aside. The car never parked; no one drove into the darkness to disappear into anyone’s warmth: it was simply a matter of being lost -true in either case, now that you think of it and feel the shame again-

You’re in a house; you’re back at the bridge; and here are your friends talking to you, but you’re wild: your mind has come apart and frantically chases all possibilities to their most distant ends, as though it cannot let any thought escape, as though one may be the salvation that can undo this accident -this accident which was a killing, wasn’t it?

No: it isn’t. And as you reason out why it isn’t -with that marvelous Ivy League mind assembling laws and precedents and exculpatory arguments- your psyche is punctured again and yet again by the shock of the trauma: you wanted peace, you wanted love, you wanted warmth and happiness, like everyone, and this is what an instant wrought, not because of you but through you. You, an observer in your life. You: a witness to happenstance and now to be blamed as its author. Well: weren’t you, driving drunk in the dark with your mind elsewhere?

She is in the water, and you see her: eyes open, hair spread out in the cold black ink gently lapping up around the pylons, and so you decide: you will be in the water too. You swim for 500 yards and 500 years and later say to your friends, when they -stunned and reasonable- ask why you didn’t call for help:

[I had] my own thoughts and feelings as I swam across that channel … that somehow when they arrived in the morning that they were going to say that Mary Jo was still alive.

(She was, you later learn: she was alive for hours, pressed into the bubble of air in the car, unable to open the doors, certainly assuming that help was on the way as the water rose, afraid and alone and relying on you-

-but you never get very far down that line of reasoning, not except when in your cups late at night and alone, when your wife has slipped into her coma and you wonder what you might have done if you were president -no more war! no more poverty!- but it’s best not to think of any of this at all).

And years pass: for how long do you assume personal moral continuity? Are you the man you were? Would you make his mistakes? Are you to blame for his frenzy, his delirium? Your just causes: aren’t they more important than the trivial matter of your own deeds? You owe it to the people to never give in to your grief, such as it is -and you feel how slight it is, how easily it is forgotten.

But the fantasy that guided you on that night, the delirious waking dream that convinced you to walk away from her as she drowned, the lunacy that you cannot explain, recurs. Sometimes you wonder if they might not burst through the door to announce that she is alive, or that she died before the car sank, or that the car was sabotaged, or that evidence shows you did all you could.

This is your dream: you didn’t find yourself one day awake in the streaming sunlight, aware that you were morally responsible for something unwilled, punishable for crimes you committed when deranged, yoked to deeds you didn’t intend to author. You wish to be judged -as do we all- only for what you willed, not for the contingency and happenstance of your life. You dream of being judged for your intentions, which were always good.

So when you die, only the good is to be spoken: you wanted what you thought was best, as do all of us, so we will pretend that is enough.

Terror and Torture

I am opposed to all forms of torture for many reasons. Nevertheless:

Two of my father’s colleagues were severely injured in the Jakarta hotel bombings, and while both are expected to survive they have suffered and will continue to suffer extraordinarily as innocent victims of a murderous act of premeditated violence. One has extensive burns and wounds over his face and body from flying glass; the other had a leg “shattered,” and both will need multiple operations. Of course: many others weren’t so lucky.

My father wrote to me today with the following questions, and should you like to answer them I’d be interested in your replies, but do keep in mind that to write something uncivil simply because we believe ourselves right exemplifies why discourse is usually fruitless. He wrote:

“Pause now to reflect for a moment on the days and nights (including no doubt today and tonight -right now) of pain and anguish these men are in for. Consider that there will be effects that last for the rest of their lives.

(1) Now tell me whether these considerations weigh or should weigh in how we think about the “enhanced” interrogation techniques used on Mullah Omar and other important terrorists likely to possess critical information.

(2) Is it relevant that, forced to choose, most of us would readily submit to water boarding and sleep deprivation before going through what the Americans and Indonesians are experiencing? If not, why not?

(3) Is it relevant that the victims of enhanced interrogation techniques can stop their ordeal by answering questions, but the victims of terrorist bombs can’t? Explain your answer.”

I have my own answers to some of these questions, and particularly the last one, but I am curious of yours. Lengthier comments are welcome here. Thoughts?

“Perhaps rationality isn’t enough.”

Robert McNamara, quoted by Errol Morris in his phenomenal NYT obituary on him: “McNamara in Context.” Morris’ profound moral gift is his insistence that we view all humans in context, from those some consider war criminals to holocaust-deniers to murderers; reading the comments on his piece, one can see how rare this gift is.

In the clarity of their own purported rationality, of their own pristine, crystalline worldview -their own systems, all failures of integrity- the harshest judges fail to learn the most important lesson McNamara, and Kennedy and Johnson and all the others, can teach: rationality isn’t enough, systems of analysis aren’t enough, belief isn’t enough to safeguard against the real essence of human existence: error.

How morally culpable is someone who is in error? How do we judge the mistaken? Does the intent to do good mitigate the accomplishment of evil? If it doesn’t, how do we make it less likely that we err? More democracy? More technocracy? More intellectualism? More emphasis on morality? Every answer has attendant historical disasters.

McNamara wanted desperately that we should learn from failed history, and in his memoir noted that because we are not omniscient we should never act violently when allies who share our morality tell us we are wrong to do so: error is too easy, and only a kind of democratic deference to others can restrain our stupidity. I would add, although he wouldn’t, that without omniscience we ought try -harder than we think reasonable- to not make irrevocable decisions involving human life. We should not kill; we should not put to death; we should not make war. We don’t know enough, cannot predict enough, and are wrong too often.

But -and I don’t mean this flippantly- it is easy enough to problematize that assertion, easy enough to see that it too could be wrong: what about the necessary war? And if there is a necessary war, is there a necessary murder, to use Auden’s regretted phrase? All human judgments are subjective assertions that strive towards objectivity; we all aspire to rationality, and sometimes must act on it whether it is sufficient or not.

(See this note, too, from Gospel of Moll: that McNamara attempted to answer these questions honestly did not protect him from grave error; if sincerity won’t, if intelligence won’t, if morality won’t, what will?)

As I’ve mentioned, I take requests when possible. It is an instance of odd serendipity that the two requests I’ve received have both concerned dogs: first, how much we love them and second, now, what it’s like eating them. Yumwatch, for reasons both culinary and ethical, has asked that I discuss what it was like consuming my favorite animal while in China.
Because I lack the needed vocabulary to describe food well -an effect of living in state of almost total gastronomic deprivation- I’ll be brief on the question of taste: dog was delicious, very tender and very rich in flavor; it did not taste like chicken, or indeed like any other meat. It seemed quite fatty, but in a pleasant way, and even a vegetarian with us made an exception and enjoyed it.
On the ethical question, I won’t retreat to spiritual vagaries about “grokking the essence” of a creature I’d as soon have spooned in my bed, but I will say that having worked in a veterinary hospital (and having lost family pets) I know that dogs don’t fear death. Living in the eternal present, without language or super-perceptual consciousness, even fear and suffering in animals are almost magically different.
But rare are those not affected by images like this or arguments like those below it, and I tend to be heartbroken by the mortality of even amphibians. Indeed, I don’t even kill cockroaches. What accounts for my willingness to eat dog is not disregard for dogs’ moral value or capacity for suffering but a simple sense of my statistical irrelevance: as my eating cows, which have personalities and nervous systems, after all, and chickens, and pigs, makes no real difference to the quantities killed, so too was my consumption of dog effectively unrelated to the killing of the dog, which was already accomplished.
And about dead meat I am not sentimental: nothing resides in the body after death of an animal (or a man, I would note outside these parentheses if I weren’t worried about seeming demented), and so the consumption of this inert material has little emotional impact on me. The reverence for flesh disconnected from life that some feel seems odd to me.
In any event, I freely admit that all this violates the chief principle of my morality: that effects and praxis have no place in real moral thought. I have no excuse for that except that, on occasion, I have been tempted against morality by the desire for experience. But I am certain that the distinction between, say, beef and dog-meat is so arbitrary as to be specious: animals feel, and merely anthropomorphizing the cow you eat less than you do your dog is not reason to consider one worth killing and eating and the other sacred.
In any event, a story from Kundera: Salvador Dali and his wife were to leave for a long trip and worried what to do with their beloved pet rabbits. One night, as he finished a delicious meal, she warmly told him that she’d killed them, cooked them, and he’d eaten them, feeling that it was only in this way that they could truly bring them along.
Salvador found this wanting: he ran to the bathroom and forced himself to vomit. What we want to protect, and how we think we can protect it, are matters of the most personal and private sort.

As I’ve mentioned, I take requests when possible. It is an instance of odd serendipity that the two requests I’ve received have both concerned dogs: first, how much we love them and second, now, what it’s like eating them. Yumwatch, for reasons both culinary and ethical, has asked that I discuss what it was like consuming my favorite animal while in China.

Because I lack the needed vocabulary to describe food well -an effect of living in state of almost total gastronomic deprivation- I’ll be brief on the question of taste: dog was delicious, very tender and very rich in flavor; it did not taste like chicken, or indeed like any other meat. It seemed quite fatty, but in a pleasant way, and even a vegetarian with us made an exception and enjoyed it.

On the ethical question, I won’t retreat to spiritual vagaries about “grokking the essence” of a creature I’d as soon have spooned in my bed, but I will say that having worked in a veterinary hospital (and having lost family pets) I know that dogs don’t fear death. Living in the eternal present, without language or super-perceptual consciousness, even fear and suffering in animals are almost magically different.

But rare are those not affected by images like this or arguments like those below it, and I tend to be heartbroken by the mortality of even amphibians. Indeed, I don’t even kill cockroaches. What accounts for my willingness to eat dog is not disregard for dogs’ moral value or capacity for suffering but a simple sense of my statistical irrelevance: as my eating cows, which have personalities and nervous systems, after all, and chickens, and pigs, makes no real difference to the quantities killed, so too was my consumption of dog effectively unrelated to the killing of the dog, which was already accomplished.

And about dead meat I am not sentimental: nothing resides in the body after death of an animal (or a man, I would note outside these parentheses if I weren’t worried about seeming demented), and so the consumption of this inert material has little emotional impact on me. The reverence for flesh disconnected from life that some feel seems odd to me.

In any event, I freely admit that all this violates the chief principle of my morality: that effects and praxis have no place in real moral thought. I have no excuse for that except that, on occasion, I have been tempted against morality by the desire for experience. But I am certain that the distinction between, say, beef and dog-meat is so arbitrary as to be specious: animals feel, and merely anthropomorphizing the cow you eat less than you do your dog is not reason to consider one worth killing and eating and the other sacred.

In any event, a story from Kundera: Salvador Dali and his wife were to leave for a long trip and worried what to do with their beloved pet rabbits. One night, as he finished a delicious meal, she warmly told him that she’d killed them, cooked them, and he’d eaten them, feeling that it was only in this way that they could truly bring them along.

Salvador found this wanting: he ran to the bathroom and forced himself to vomit. What we want to protect, and how we think we can protect it, are matters of the most personal and private sort.

Sophie Scholl, of the White Rose resistance group; killed February 22, 1943.
Clive James, despite his atheism, wrote that Sophie Scholl “was probably a saint” and compared her to Jesus Christ; her face on German postage stamps is as great a symbol of transformation as Saul’s conversion, a demonstration that neither a state nor a human is ever beyond redemption.
There is some question, however, as to whether every member of our species remains human; in their spellbound, somnambulistic stupor, the Germans of the 1930s and 1940s can be said at the very least to have permitted as inhuman a machine as was imaginable  to assemble itself from their institutions and indeed their very body politic: the infernal Nazi state which defies credulity and has thus become myth. We feel that the Germans, the Wermacht, the Nazis, the Gestapo, must have been monsters, not ordinary typical humans as we are.
Whatever they were, there were few dissenters in their midst; and even if one objected to Nazism, one knew one could do nothing; and had one a family, what would running out into the street to be shot down by the SS as they came to capture one’s neighbor do anyway but assure that one’s child, too, would die in a camp, or at least be orphaned? Against sufficient power, morality is purely sacrificial; even if we can accept this for ourselves, can we accept it on behalf of others who need us?
Perhaps this is why the White Rose was comprised of the young, though not exclusively. A small, hopeless band of Germans who resisted the Nazi regime, they engaged in the simple, chiefly symbolic act of circulating essays which attempted to wake readers from the sociopathic trance in which they seemed to have been lulled by Hitler.

That students, powerless and doubtless aware that they faced assured death were they caught, turned to the essay as a means of protest is significant; they were using the expression of the West’s cultural heritage, its literary and rational tradition, as means to combat the negation of that heritage: irrational authoritarianism:
It is impossible to engage in intellectual discourse with National Socialism because it is not an intellectually defensible program. It is false to speak of a National Socialist philosophy… At its very inception this movement depended on the deception and betrayal of one’s fellow man; even at that time it was inwardly corrupt and could support itself only by constant lies. After all, Hitler states in an early edition of “his” book (a book written in the worst German I have ever read, in spite of the fact that it has been elevated to the position of the Bible in this nation of poets and thinkers): “It is unbelievable, to what extent one must betray a people in order to rule it.”
In their leaflets, which quoted Goethe and Aristotle, they argued both for intellectual resistance and for sabotage, and called attention to the slaughter of the Jews, the Poles, and others, asserting every argument against the Nazi machine they could muster: on theological, practical, political, patriotic, historical, artistic, and moral grounds they fought the lies of propaganda and the delirium of the trance-state.
As they surely knew would happen, they were caught; in 1943, all were arrested by the Gestapo, tried, and executed. There is a great deal more about their story here; it is as moving as anything I know. As one playwright noted:
The fact that [these] little kids, in the mouth of the wolf, where it really counted, had the tremendous courage to do what they did, is spectacular to me. I know that the world is better for them having been there, but I do not know why.
The emphasized last line seems crucial to me; I can only suggest that in their sacrificial courage, their refusal to abrogate their innate moral duty -which tens of millions of their peers had happily neglected-, and their sagacity despite their youth, the White Rose confirm that there was the finest sort of humanity even in the midst of that infernal machine. Maybe it is that they remind us that heroism is possible for all.
(Note: I’d written and abandoned dozens of posts about them several months ago while briefly fixated by ideas about morality, resigning myself to the customary sense of oafishness one feels when speaking of the very precious, but was reminded of them again by the eminent B. Michael’s note about Holland, 1954, a Neutral Milk Hotel song which mentions them. It isn’t surprising that Jeff Mangum alludes to them; one can easily grow as obsessed with the White Rose as with Anne Frank, and I find it hard not to search photos of Sophie Scholl for signs of her core, the source of her heroism, the looming loss).

Sophie Scholl, of the White Rose resistance group; killed February 22, 1943.

Clive James, despite his atheism, wrote that Sophie Scholl “was probably a saint” and compared her to Jesus Christ; her face on German postage stamps is as great a symbol of transformation as Saul’s conversion, a demonstration that neither a state nor a human is ever beyond redemption.

There is some question, however, as to whether every member of our species remains human; in their spellbound, somnambulistic stupor, the Germans of the 1930s and 1940s can be said at the very least to have permitted as inhuman a machine as was imaginable  to assemble itself from their institutions and indeed their very body politic: the infernal Nazi state which defies credulity and has thus become myth. We feel that the Germans, the Wermacht, the Nazis, the Gestapo, must have been monsters, not ordinary typical humans as we are.

Whatever they were, there were few dissenters in their midst; and even if one objected to Nazism, one knew one could do nothing; and had one a family, what would running out into the street to be shot down by the SS as they came to capture one’s neighbor do anyway but assure that one’s child, too, would die in a camp, or at least be orphaned? Against sufficient power, morality is purely sacrificial; even if we can accept this for ourselves, can we accept it on behalf of others who need us?

Perhaps this is why the White Rose was comprised of the young, though not exclusively. A small, hopeless band of Germans who resisted the Nazi regime, they engaged in the simple, chiefly symbolic act of circulating essays which attempted to wake readers from the sociopathic trance in which they seemed to have been lulled by Hitler.

That students, powerless and doubtless aware that they faced assured death were they caught, turned to the essay as a means of protest is significant; they were using the expression of the West’s cultural heritage, its literary and rational tradition, as means to combat the negation of that heritage: irrational authoritarianism:

It is impossible to engage in intellectual discourse with National Socialism because it is not an intellectually defensible program. It is false to speak of a National Socialist philosophy… At its very inception this movement depended on the deception and betrayal of one’s fellow man; even at that time it was inwardly corrupt and could support itself only by constant lies. After all, Hitler states in an early edition of “his” book (a book written in the worst German I have ever read, in spite of the fact that it has been elevated to the position of the Bible in this nation of poets and thinkers): “It is unbelievable, to what extent one must betray a people in order to rule it.”

In their leaflets, which quoted Goethe and Aristotle, they argued both for intellectual resistance and for sabotage, and called attention to the slaughter of the Jews, the Poles, and others, asserting every argument against the Nazi machine they could muster: on theological, practical, political, patriotic, historical, artistic, and moral grounds they fought the lies of propaganda and the delirium of the trance-state.

As they surely knew would happen, they were caught; in 1943, all were arrested by the Gestapo, tried, and executed. There is a great deal more about their story here; it is as moving as anything I know. As one playwright noted:

The fact that [these] little kids, in the mouth of the wolf, where it really counted, had the tremendous courage to do what they did, is spectacular to me. I know that the world is better for them having been there, but I do not know why.

The emphasized last line seems crucial to me; I can only suggest that in their sacrificial courage, their refusal to abrogate their innate moral duty -which tens of millions of their peers had happily neglected-, and their sagacity despite their youth, the White Rose confirm that there was the finest sort of humanity even in the midst of that infernal machine. Maybe it is that they remind us that heroism is possible for all.

(Note: I’d written and abandoned dozens of posts about them several months ago while briefly fixated by ideas about morality, resigning myself to the customary sense of oafishness one feels when speaking of the very precious, but was reminded of them again by the eminent B. Michael’s note about Holland, 1954, a Neutral Milk Hotel song which mentions them. It isn’t surprising that Jeff Mangum alludes to them; one can easily grow as obsessed with the White Rose as with Anne Frank, and I find it hard not to search photos of Sophie Scholl for signs of her core, the source of her heroism, the looming loss).

“To reform an evildoer, you must before anything else help him to an awareness that what he did was evil.”

Alfred Polgar. “You must help him to an awareness…” Derision is not help; brutal exposure of perceived logical errors is not help; sarcastic decimation of straw-men is not help. Also: neither agreement nor acquiescence nor victory are synonymous with awareness.

This relates to a previous post on moral vigilantism, and I think well-summarizes why much of what is written against those we oppose is merely intended to pleasure ourselves: rhetoric is often onanistic.

What is Wrong with Bad Art?

I’m still not sure why failed or bad attempts at art are “immoral”. -Dad commenting on this.

This is a controversial point, but it wasn’t for Plato. The quality of art he despises in The Republic is that it misleads. It conditions us to expect and hope for what will not come, in his view; it is a saccharine lie or an ideological lie or an incompetent lie. One needs only to think of propaganda to know what he meant, but one can also imagine a middle-American mom disappointed that her camping trip doesn’t look like a Thomas Kincaide painting or shattered that her romance isn’t reminiscent of The Notebook.

Art’s mission has changed since Plato’s time; it now serves less often as a vehicle for explicit messages than as a vehicle for quasi-impartial exploration. That is hugely important, and why art as we understand it emerges from the Western tradition first: it is bound up with notions of liberty and the individual.

But bad art naturally remains. When Plato forbids poets and painters from his ideal city, he does so for the health of the populace: they must not be deceived about the world or their place in it. When I watch television or read pulp novels or see movies who serve mainly to reinforce body dysmorphia and status anxiety, his argument resonates.

That is: bad art obscures reality, lulls us into a stupor in which we are confused about who and what we are and how the world is, manipulates us cheaply and in a way that reinforces our worst habits of feeling, and drives us further from any sort of awareness.

When we read bad books or savor bad movies, we sometimes tell ourselves that they have no effect: they are just for fun. But not only is the human mind too porous for that to be true, even how we have fun is something learned; we condition ourselves through exposure such that choosing the worst over the best is a perverse way to deform ourselves.

When I play violent video games, my dreams get bloody; what will happen if I immerse myself in television, then? We think we are stronger than we are: too many fairy tales heard, too many bronzed and plastic bodies seen, and we cannot accept reality; we want its televisual simulation more. We will close our eyes when having sex to preserve the dream.

The radically inaccurate expectations we have of each other, of the world, of ourselves, the confused sense we grow up with that life is something happening tomorrow and that we will attain happiness if only we find someone attractive enough (or are attractive enough ourselves): these are easily identified as the wounds of bad art. But art that is marginally better is no less harmful; I remember thinking how American Beauty would further embed certain terribly shallow memes into our psyche and incline us to reduce our fellow humans to caricatures.

In sum: good art increases one’s understanding of the self and the world through exploration, simulation, provocation, and so on; bad art decreases it persistently and does so by its sentimentally exploitative nature as much as its incompetence. It violates the purpose of art and does damage to us all: hence its immorality.

The Pleasures of Vigilantism

“In any dispute the intensity of feeling is inversely proportional to the value of the stakes at issue.”-Sayre’s Law

Outraged moral vigilantism is the preferred role of the truly self-regarding; it affords its enactor a degree of rhetorical drama usually present only in thundering Hollywood courtroom scenes and permits a degree of smug self-satisfaction to accompany acts of violence. It is only the indignant vigilante who may at once try to hurt others and claim to be the victim of their stupidity, who may simultaneously attack and claim to defend, who may enact the ultimate passive-aggression: to persecute those s/he hates while declaring that it is they who offend.

Intellectuals are deeply attracted to such vigilantism, perhaps because –as Sayre famously noted- the fighting is most bitter when the stakes are low. Moreover, intellectuals are accustomed to being derided; at the first chance to deride another, we are ecstatic; we tend to be quite mean, given the chance. This ecstasy would be accompanied by guilt were it not for the intellectual’s innate capacity for rationalization: I am not being mean! Those I mock and attack and pick apart are, by their very lifestyles and characters, egregiously offensive to the just moral order! They are attention whores and materialists and racists and narcissists! They deserve to be hurt!

It is perhaps worth noting that everyone who hurts anyone thinks it is justified. But we might also ask: why do moral vigilantes hurt others? The general explanation –that someone needs to do it, that the world needs intellectual or aesthetic or moral policemen- fails to persuade. This is evident for the simple reason that people who mock others, who are morally outraged by what they perceive in others, do not want those people to change or go away. They use ineffectual methods deliberately.

If they wanted them to change, they would attempt –as we all do when trying to correct someone we love or persuade someone we respect- to compassionately, patiently, and with tremendous care argue their perspective, with only one stylistic imperative: to not alienate them, to not hurt them, to keep them engaged and willing to change. This does not guarantee success, of course, but it is the only feasible way to argue if we actually hope to persuade: start from what is shared, make sure you are respectful, and communicate that you are not attacking, only hoping to help.

If they wanted them to vanish, they would ignore them. Then they have vanished! It is like magic! If they want to show the world what is wrong with their targets, they would be what they think someone ought to be and illustrate by contrast: always more effective than illustration through attack.

But moral vigilantes enjoy hurting people, despite the fact that no one learns from derision or mockery or even brilliantly witty cruelty. Indeed, the opposite happens: curse me, laugh at me, attack and humiliate me, and I retreat into myself, cement my identity, fortify my defenses, become ever more committed to those elements of my identity under siege. Indeed, we might say: the surest way to preserve and perpetuate what you dislike in someone is to attack them for it. The surest way to eradicate what you dislike in someone, of course, is to stop disliking things in others; but that is much harder than tossing off a profane screed or savaging someone’s prose.

The final issue remains: what is it about us that inclines us to want to hurt others instead of trying to change them or showing the world what we think a person ought to be? I believe –based purely on what makes me angry, what makes me want to be mean- that it is always pain, always insecurity, always some inner torment. I have noted with alarm that almost everyone who angers me does so, as Hermann Hesse predicted, by reminding me of something I dislike in myself. The moral vigilante who hates others for their narcissism believes his or her feelings about narcissists are so important that they should be publicized to the anguish of the narcissists: if this isn’t narcissism, what is?

And so I propose this axiom, which can be contested but which guides me now, particularly in my writing: in almost all cases, to tell someone something is wrong with them is only to announce what is wrong with us. It is worse than mean, worse than ineffectual: it is literally counter-productive, and represents only our desire to attack while wearing the romantic mantle of the defender; like any desire, it tells the world more about us than about its object.

Note: this has little bearing on criticism as academically understood, of works or arguments, only on criticism of people; moreover, I am aware that I have been exceedingly guilty of this in my life and can only apologize to those whom my arrogance, criticism, and meanness have wounded.

Update: Jeff Miller very rightly notes that I’ve erred in ascribing malice to moral vigilantes (indeed, I likely did so because they remind me of myself: I needed some critical distance as self-assurance!). His comment is excellent; he points out that moral outrage is “imparted to us in childhood such that it becomes almost instinctual and unthinking…driven by habit, and not enjoyment… Are not some arguably misled to think that their actions are persuasive; that ridicules produces change and conformity? And if they believe that this change is necessary to save a soul (through religion, or even aesthetics or philosophy), aren’t they perhaps bound in allegiance to something higher than enjoyment? … Moreover, the biggest moral vigilantes I’ve met are rather unhappy people; they may be getting something from their crusade, but I wonder if it’s enjoyment…” Agreed.

Daniel Holter, whom I found through the wonderful Unburying the Lead, linked to an article which mentioned that George Bush chose for the Oval Office a painting the very subject of which he misunderstood:
“He often tells visitors that it depicts Methodist circuit riders—missionaries who spread the Good Word across the Alleghenies in the 19th century. It actually depicts a horse thief fleeing a mob.”

The link in the above paragraph leads to a fuller explanation of the error, one which we may be inclined to consider instructive, or perhaps symbolic (indeed, if Bush’s presidency were the fiction of a novelist and he included such an overt illustration of its nature, we’d criticize him for being too neat, too heavy-handed).
The author continues: “Bush’s inspiring, proselytizing Methodist is in fact a horse thief fleeing from a lynch mob. It seems a fitting marker for the Bush presidency. Bush has consistently exhibited what psychologists call the “Tolstoy syndrome.” That is, he is completely convinced he knows what things are, so he shuts down all avenues of inquiry about them and disregards the information that is offered to him.”
This seemed striking to me for many reasons, not least that while I agree that Bush has been “completely convinced he knows what things are,” I am at the same time acquainted with very few who are not similarly convinced of the accuracy of their own worldviews. We have the good sense, thanks to our pluralist educations, to deploy a kind of tact as a hedge against accusations of arrogance, but that’s mere etiquette.
It is easily illustrated: simply recall the US presidential election. Were we not constantly astounded at the stupidity of the other side? Did it not seem impossible to us that anyone could vote for the candidate we opposed? In general, aren’t we amazed that the entire world doesn’t see how obvious the solutions to most major problems are? Don’t we casually call “erroneous” the views of many millions of people, including thousands of academics and thinkers older and more experienced than we are, whenever they contradict our own?
Whenever there is a debate, we have a side; where there is disagreement, we inevitably have a solution! We know what is best for Iraq, Israel, Wall Street, and possibly the Earth itself! If only we were in charge!
And if that strikes you as odd, it is probably because you perceive this arrogance in others but not in yourself; you nod and think, “Yes, people are so sure of themselves,” thereby suggesting that you are not such a person! (And perhaps you are not).
Tolstoy syndrome is more properly called “confirmation bias,” but is associated with the author because of this quote:

“I know that most men, including those at ease with problems of the greatest complexity, can seldom accept the simplest and most obvious truth if it be such as would oblige them to admit the falsity of conclusions which they have proudly taught to others, and which they have woven, thread by thread, into the fabrics of their life”.
But not us! You and I are ready -ever ready- to interrogate our most cherished ideas and abandon them when we encounter sufficient reason, yes? We are not like Bush! We don’t make mistakes and we’re not close-minded and we’d only govern and control and use the mechanisms of the state for the best ends! We know about global warming, about economic theory, about foreign policy, which must be more moral!
As soon as we can take over the world, we will shower it with our golden wisdom! 
(To achieve this sublime end, of course, some reactionary elements will need to be overcome; such is the nature of revolution).
That these journalists feel compelled to deploy dehumanizing quasi-medical (“objective”) jargon to describe Bush is as fascinating as Bush’s own foibles: it makes clear that in precisely the same way that Bush unthinkingly and unreflectively acted the part of the self-assured blunderer, the thinker-gone-awry whose convictions lead us into disaster, so some of his critics will insist that they would never do so, that their minds are open and their hearts are full of light and their opinions are ever-accurate. That this is pure bullshit has been so totally demonstrated by history that it’s scarcely worth rebutting, but I will note that while I believe in Obama’s admirable humility and consideration for his opponents, I see no evidence that the great masses of Democrats and Republicans are any closer to adopting this posture. Cultural critics, intellectuals, and artists in particular are odious in this respect, which is one of the reasons why our kind are so little-trusted by the public.
But at least we never make mistakes about art!

Daniel Holter, whom I found through the wonderful Unburying the Lead, linked to an article which mentioned that George Bush chose for the Oval Office a painting the very subject of which he misunderstood:

He often tells visitors that it depicts Methodist circuit riders—missionaries who spread the Good Word across the Alleghenies in the 19th century. It actually depicts a horse thief fleeing a mob.”

The link in the above paragraph leads to a fuller explanation of the error, one which we may be inclined to consider instructive, or perhaps symbolic (indeed, if Bush’s presidency were the fiction of a novelist and he included such an overt illustration of its nature, we’d criticize him for being too neat, too heavy-handed).

The author continues: “Bush’s inspiring, proselytizing Methodist is in fact a horse thief fleeing from a lynch mob. It seems a fitting marker for the Bush presidency. Bush has consistently exhibited what psychologists call the “Tolstoy syndrome.” That is, he is completely convinced he knows what things are, so he shuts down all avenues of inquiry about them and disregards the information that is offered to him.”

This seemed striking to me for many reasons, not least that while I agree that Bush has been “completely convinced he knows what things are,” I am at the same time acquainted with very few who are not similarly convinced of the accuracy of their own worldviews. We have the good sense, thanks to our pluralist educations, to deploy a kind of tact as a hedge against accusations of arrogance, but that’s mere etiquette.

It is easily illustrated: simply recall the US presidential election. Were we not constantly astounded at the stupidity of the other side? Did it not seem impossible to us that anyone could vote for the candidate we opposed? In general, aren’t we amazed that the entire world doesn’t see how obvious the solutions to most major problems are? Don’t we casually call “erroneous” the views of many millions of people, including thousands of academics and thinkers older and more experienced than we are, whenever they contradict our own?

Whenever there is a debate, we have a side; where there is disagreement, we inevitably have a solution! We know what is best for Iraq, Israel, Wall Street, and possibly the Earth itself! If only we were in charge!

And if that strikes you as odd, it is probably because you perceive this arrogance in others but not in yourself; you nod and think, “Yes, people are so sure of themselves,” thereby suggesting that you are not such a person! (And perhaps you are not).

Tolstoy syndrome is more properly called “confirmation bias,” but is associated with the author because of this quote:

“I know that most men, including those at ease with problems of the greatest complexity, can seldom accept the simplest and most obvious truth if it be such as would oblige them to admit the falsity of conclusions which they have proudly taught to others, and which they have woven, thread by thread, into the fabrics of their life”.

But not us! You and I are ready -ever ready- to interrogate our most cherished ideas and abandon them when we encounter sufficient reason, yes? We are not like Bush! We don’t make mistakes and we’re not close-minded and we’d only govern and control and use the mechanisms of the state for the best ends! We know about global warming, about economic theory, about foreign policy, which must be more moral!

As soon as we can take over the world, we will shower it with our golden wisdom!

(To achieve this sublime end, of course, some reactionary elements will need to be overcome; such is the nature of revolution).

That these journalists feel compelled to deploy dehumanizing quasi-medical (“objective”) jargon to describe Bush is as fascinating as Bush’s own foibles: it makes clear that in precisely the same way that Bush unthinkingly and unreflectively acted the part of the self-assured blunderer, the thinker-gone-awry whose convictions lead us into disaster, so some of his critics will insist that they would never do so, that their minds are open and their hearts are full of light and their opinions are ever-accurate. That this is pure bullshit has been so totally demonstrated by history that it’s scarcely worth rebutting, but I will note that while I believe in Obama’s admirable humility and consideration for his opponents, I see no evidence that the great masses of Democrats and Republicans are any closer to adopting this posture. Cultural critics, intellectuals, and artists in particular are odious in this respect, which is one of the reasons why our kind are so little-trusted by the public.

But at least we never make mistakes about art!

Morality

Although I am an atheist, I am very fond of religions and respect belief in them completely (for reasons I’ve discussed previously). Much, though not all, religious tradition is codified morality of a very fine sort, the sort imbued with an otherworldly detachment from ends. While the practitioners of religious morality -being human- have often been deviously barbaric, the ideas themselves and their interwoven mythical justifications can be both beautiful and transformative.

Ordinary morality, concerned with praxis and outcomes, is problematized by subjectivity as well as human nature; as Nietzsche noted, “All things are subject to interpretation; whichever interpretation prevails at a given time is a function of power and not truth.” From the start, any individual or collective assessments of reality and their according moral deliberations are debatable, endlessly so. This does not mean that nothing is good or that nothing is evil, but it does multiply the gradations of gray between those poles. And since error is the central feature of human existence,” the most important moral decisions about when we may kill, when we should die, how many civilians we may incinerate incidentally and for what ends, are in my view fundamentally indecent to make. We are too likely to be wrong to take life. As J.U. Neuf put it in 1950, “The total wars of our time have been the result of a series of intellectual mistakes.”

When I say pure morality is unconcerned with ends, I mean it is concerned only with means, with the conduct of the individual. The state of the world is never within your control; only your behavior is. A pure moral system -which arbitrates your relationship with the world- cannot depend at all on variables beyond your control or it is worthless, contingent, ungoverning. Thus pure morality has little to say about justice or peace or other political concepts involving the group; rather, justice and peace emerge from aggregated individual morality.

(This is why efforts to “legislate morality” are deeply problematic. As social morality is an emergent phenomenon, it is not within our capacity to lead the horse with the cart by enforcing ends; we must be and inspire moral individuals, a process nearly impossible except on the interpersonal scale).

Long ago, I asked my father what was extraordinary about Jesus’ willingness to be crucified. After all, I asked: if I proposed to him that he might die painfully but would in doing so give eternal and blissful life to every human being who wanted it, wouldn’t he say yes? Given the context of the Gospels, wouldn’t he be elated to save sinful humanity? I ask this of parents: wouldn’t you die to give your child infinite life without suffering? Wouldn’t we all love to have this: a chance to sacrifice for the good of all humanity, a chance to redeem the world? And to know while doing so that an afterlife awaited you?

If we posit that there was a heroic and incontestably valuable end, we reduce the power of his self-sacrifice, though not completely. (My father proposed that Christians assume Jesus was so fully human that he didn’t know or couldn’t believe in those aspects of his mission, particularly while on the cross; if that is the case, I regret proposing my analysis).

In World War II, Gandhi advised Jews threatened by Nazism that they “…should have offered themselves to the butcher’s knife… They should have thrown themselves into the sea from cliffs… Collective suicide would have been heroism.” We shudder at his morality, but that is purity: the “hatred of the world” Kierkegaard spoke of, the refusal to engage in any defense of self, family, or friend at the expense of another life. Gandhi will not defend Indians; Jesus will not save the crucified thieves. (This is why the Buddha felt that children were chains: they bind you in love to the world your status in it; you cannot, for example, martyr yourself resisting the SS if you have a family who will suffer for your deed).

This morality is difficult if one hopes to improve the world-which I why I would never engage in political action- and I admit that in any material sense it is indefensible. Civilization is the result of ever-improving efforts at implementing broader moral systems (efforts with fits and starts, to be sure), which is another reason why moral teachers and prophets are typically renunciatory: they have no business in society.

The world cannot and perhaps should not be composed of such people: pure in moral austerity, willing to die, willing to let kin die, willing to let the world do whatever it may without ever resisting, mindful of the fact that to fight for is always to fight against and disinclined therefore to fight at all. In extremity, morality becomes unacceptable to us; Gandhi’s ahimsa seems loathsome when we think of Hitler. And indeed, what would we say now to Jesus, who would not kill Bin Laden, or even assassinate Hitler himself?

This morality seems inhuman, practically, but it is in this morality that I am most interested, in how it problematizes the affairs of state, the laws we enact, the deeds we condone, and most of all in how in emulating the exemplars of this morality we achieve the very ends we’ve turned away from in doing so: justice and peace.

Hence Gandhi’s wonderful quote: “Be the change you want to see in the world.” Do not seek it; do not legislate it; do not fight for it. Be it.

The ruins of the oldest monastery in the Western world, destroyed by allied bombing during the Battle of Monte Cassino.
The novelist Walter Miller, who participated in the destruction of the abbey where St. Benedict first organized monastic life in 524 CE, despaired for the rest of his life over our tendency to grind into dust all that we cherish with our periodic wars and our ever-advancing technology. In addition to writing the remarkable A Canticle for Leibowitz, Miller practiced Catholicism for many years, and his novel proposes that the role of religion is to preserve the human -the individual- from the indifferent tyranny of history, politics, and “just” wars. That religion is often part of history, politics, and wars is a problem of its practitioners. Miller opposed, then committed, suicide: another illustration of the tensions between belief and practice, tragic and archetypal.
Whether wars are just or not is an unanswerable question; every war is just to some participants, unjust to others, and a catastrophe for all, whether they know it or not. This is neither to say that no wars should be fought or that all wars are equally justifiable; it is merely a fact that all humans believe in their moral code, will kill for it even, and do not care in the inevitable conflicts about the opposing moral codes of their enemies (which they will accuse of incoherence, disingenuousness, or brutality but which are no less felt). Everyone can be given a hypothetical to which they will answer: “Yes, kill, kill!”
All there is to say about war is that we are sorry that history and circumstance and the deeds of the dead place us in opposition to one another, that our memories of slaughtered kin compel us to seek revenge, that it is impossible to establish the point at which the acts of entities like armies and governments can be repaid on individuals, that this world has innumerable conflicts without solutions and that history says only power resolves these by annihilating disagreement, and that our nature ensures all this more or less in perpetuity.
The destruction of the abbey turned out to have been a mistake, an unnecessary poetic flourish to a forgotten part of World War II. As with most mistakes, it tells more about us than the well-executed parts of our hideous plans:

While the original manuscripts and rare artifacts were safely removed from the site, there were several sick and bed-ridden monks and nuns who remained in the monastery. Several of the healthier nuns refused to leave the bedsides of the sick unless they too could be removed. After very limited, unsuccessful attempts by German officers to have the healthier nuns evacuate, German forces retreated down the north side of the mountain late on May 11, leaving the ill nuns in the complex. Several Catholic German soldiers protested this order, but it was ironically a 36-year old Lutheran Obergefreiter of the German 305th Infantry Division, 305th Artillery Regiment who defied the order to abandon the nuns. Eugen Schmid of Stuttgart, a veteran of the Battle of Stalingrad who was one of the few surviving members of the 305th to return to action, told his superior officers that he could not in good conscience let the ill nuns succumb to bombing. German officers refused to give Schmid any motorized equipment or personnel assistance, telling him that he would undertake the operation solo and at his own risk. At around 0100 on May 12, Schmid borrowed a rickety, wooden cart and horse from a nearby farmer and defiantly organized a squad of mostly privates to accompany him to the monastery. Once at the top, Schmid pleaded with the nuns to come, telling them that he brought a cart to evacuate the ill monks and nuns, along with each of the attending nuns. Schmid and his team carried the ill nuns and monks to the cart. They slowly started down the mountain, reaching the north side of Monte Cassino by around 0700 on May 12. Schmid was given no decorations by German authorities for his daring rescue, but received a centuries-old, gold medal bearing the likeness of St. Benedict from the Mother Superior of Monte Cassino, who placed the medal around his neck and said a short prayer with him and his volunteers. She wished for them health and safety, and that they each return home with God’s will and with the praise and thanks of each of the nuns and brothers of Monte Cassino.

There were doubtless other acts of heroism, of decency across national, ethnic, and linguistic lines, and of sacrifice beyond that compelled by hatred and strife. There was also a bear…

The ruins of the oldest monastery in the Western world, destroyed by allied bombing during the Battle of Monte Cassino.

The novelist Walter Miller, who participated in the destruction of the abbey where St. Benedict first organized monastic life in 524 CE, despaired for the rest of his life over our tendency to grind into dust all that we cherish with our periodic wars and our ever-advancing technology. In addition to writing the remarkable A Canticle for Leibowitz, Miller practiced Catholicism for many years, and his novel proposes that the role of religion is to preserve the human -the individual- from the indifferent tyranny of history, politics, and “just” wars. That religion is often part of history, politics, and wars is a problem of its practitioners. Miller opposed, then committed, suicide: another illustration of the tensions between belief and practice, tragic and archetypal.

Whether wars are just or not is an unanswerable question; every war is just to some participants, unjust to others, and a catastrophe for all, whether they know it or not. This is neither to say that no wars should be fought or that all wars are equally justifiable; it is merely a fact that all humans believe in their moral code, will kill for it even, and do not care in the inevitable conflicts about the opposing moral codes of their enemies (which they will accuse of incoherence, disingenuousness, or brutality but which are no less felt). Everyone can be given a hypothetical to which they will answer: “Yes, kill, kill!”

All there is to say about war is that we are sorry that history and circumstance and the deeds of the dead place us in opposition to one another, that our memories of slaughtered kin compel us to seek revenge, that it is impossible to establish the point at which the acts of entities like armies and governments can be repaid on individuals, that this world has innumerable conflicts without solutions and that history says only power resolves these by annihilating disagreement, and that our nature ensures all this more or less in perpetuity.

The destruction of the abbey turned out to have been a mistake, an unnecessary poetic flourish to a forgotten part of World War II. As with most mistakes, it tells more about us than the well-executed parts of our hideous plans:

While the original manuscripts and rare artifacts were safely removed from the site, there were several sick and bed-ridden monks and nuns who remained in the monastery. Several of the healthier nuns refused to leave the bedsides of the sick unless they too could be removed. After very limited, unsuccessful attempts by German officers to have the healthier nuns evacuate, German forces retreated down the north side of the mountain late on May 11, leaving the ill nuns in the complex. Several Catholic German soldiers protested this order, but it was ironically a 36-year old Lutheran Obergefreiter of the German 305th Infantry Division, 305th Artillery Regiment who defied the order to abandon the nuns. Eugen Schmid of Stuttgart, a veteran of the Battle of Stalingrad who was one of the few surviving members of the 305th to return to action, told his superior officers that he could not in good conscience let the ill nuns succumb to bombing. German officers refused to give Schmid any motorized equipment or personnel assistance, telling him that he would undertake the operation solo and at his own risk. At around 0100 on May 12, Schmid borrowed a rickety, wooden cart and horse from a nearby farmer and defiantly organized a squad of mostly privates to accompany him to the monastery. Once at the top, Schmid pleaded with the nuns to come, telling them that he brought a cart to evacuate the ill monks and nuns, along with each of the attending nuns. Schmid and his team carried the ill nuns and monks to the cart. They slowly started down the mountain, reaching the north side of Monte Cassino by around 0700 on May 12. Schmid was given no decorations by German authorities for his daring rescue, but received a centuries-old, gold medal bearing the likeness of St. Benedict from the Mother Superior of Monte Cassino, who placed the medal around his neck and said a short prayer with him and his volunteers. She wished for them health and safety, and that they each return home with God’s will and with the praise and thanks of each of the nuns and brothers of Monte Cassino.

There were doubtless other acts of heroism, of decency across national, ethnic, and linguistic lines, and of sacrifice beyond that compelled by hatred and strife. There was also a bear

Also Sprach Thusly

Superdoofus-Stratodrive (also known as Thusly) is one of my favorites, if not for the stories and skull-obsessing then for these quotes and comments. The second may be the most meaningful celebration of sport (or perhaps battle) I’ve read, and the first and last are amazing:

every time mills breaks out nietzsche, i’ll break out mccarthy passages tempered by one from dosteyefsky.

moral law is an invention of mankind for the disenfranchisement of the powerful in favor of the weak. historical law subverts it at every turn. a moral view can never be proven right or wrong by any ultimate test. a man falling dead in a duel is not thought thereby to be proven in error as to his views. his very involvement in such a trial gives evidence of a new and broader view.

why? i’ll use my grasp of <blockquote> to expand:

men are born for games. nothing else. every child knows that play is nobler than work. he knows too that the worth or merit of a game is not inherent in the game itself but rather in the value of that which is put at hazard. games of chance require a wager to have meaning at all. games of sport involve the skill and strength of the opponents and the humiliation of defeat and the pride of victory are in themselves sufficient stake because they inhere in the worth of the principals and define them. but the trial of chance or trial of worth all games aspire to the condition of war for here that which is wagered swallows up the game, player, all.

now let’s see what that hurler of invective has to say, shall we?

granted i am a babbler, a harmless vexatious babbler, like all of us. but what is to be done if the direct and sole vocation of every intelligent man is babble, that is, the intentional pouring of water through a sieve?

i guess i’ll see you in hell, mills.