mills

My name is Mills Baker; I write about love, culture, art, religion, mental illness, philosophy, memory, politics and the rather random.

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Posts tagged history.
Searchlights and anti-aircraft fire over Los Angeles.
Late on February 24 and in the early hours of February 25, 1942, anti-aircraft guns in Los Angeles fired 1,400 shells at unidentified objects spotted in a sky illuminated by searchlights. Subsequently described as a false-alarm due to “war nerves,” the incident followed the shelling on February 23 of an oil-field near Santa Barbara by a Japanese submarine.
Three civilians were killed by the anti-aircraft fire in the so-called Battle of Los Angeles. A contemporary radio broadcast can be heard here. I learned all this researching the movie they’re shooting a block from my house which, it appears, will be quite bad.

Searchlights and anti-aircraft fire over Los Angeles.

Late on February 24 and in the early hours of February 25, 1942, anti-aircraft guns in Los Angeles fired 1,400 shells at unidentified objects spotted in a sky illuminated by searchlights. Subsequently described as a false-alarm due to “war nerves,” the incident followed the shelling on February 23 of an oil-field near Santa Barbara by a Japanese submarine.

Three civilians were killed by the anti-aircraft fire in the so-called Battle of Los Angeles. A contemporary radio broadcast can be heard here. I learned all this researching the movie they’re shooting a block from my house which, it appears, will be quite bad.

One of the most famous of E.J. Bellocq’s photographs of prostitutes in New Orleans’ Storyville district, where sex work was legal from 1897-1917. See below for more.

One of the most famous of E.J. Bellocq’s photographs of prostitutes in New Orleans’ Storyville district, where sex work was legal from 1897-1917. See below for more.

“Kierkegaard is a star, although he shines over territory that is almost inaccessible to me.”

Franz Kafka, to Oskar Baum. Kafka doesn’t mean that Kierkegaard illuminates a Christian world which is alien to his Judiasm; he elsewhere wrote that Kierkegaard “is on the same side of the world. He bears me out like a friend.”

Indeed, Kafka’s Judiasm had as its greatest effect his preoccupation with gnosis and textual indeterminacy, with an endless exegetical pursuit of truth long since vanished from the word and the world. To a lesser extent, it provided an atmosphere and some iconography for his mind, and no German-speaking Jewish man living in Prague in the early 20th century could escape the relentless othering that so dislocated and alienated him.

But reductive analyses fail clumsily with Kafka, who was a modernist writer more than a Jew or a neurotic or a Czech or a European or a mystic. It is in his modernism, which we largely share -post merely being a prefix- that we find what put the Kierkegaardian territory “almost” beyond reach:

For Kierkegaard the absurd -the suprarational- remained an alternative to the world of reductive, superficial reason; for Kafka, the absurd -the irrational- had become the world of superficial contemporaneity. What was transcendence for Kierkegaard was, in distorted form, a reality for Kafka: the senseless world of anti-rational, post-human social derangement.

The territory of religious commitment as a turning-against-the-world was almost inaccessible to Kafka, who saw the world turning against itself; Kierkegaard drew inspiration from Abraham’s irrational willingness to murder his son, while Kafka saw that soon, functionaries would commit atrocities by the millions without asking for a rationale.

This is why Kierkegaard is timeless -Wittgenstein said: “Kierkegaard was by far the most profound thinker of the last century. Kierkegaard was a saint.” Kafka, on the other hand, wasn’t a saint but a prophet: he saw as early as anyone what modernism meant: reason run amok and no solace beyond reason, no leap permitted.

(Note: the awesome Greg Brown and I have been arguing over whether fiction or non-fiction is superior, is more real, in Meaghano’s comments; I think Kafka’s prescience is a good example of why the novel will always illuminate more than the essay: we must imagine before we describe).

“Within the next generation I believe that the world’s leaders will discover that infant conditioning and narco-hypnosis are more efficient, as instruments of government, than clubs and prisons, and that the lust for power can be just as completely satisfied by suggesting people into loving their servitude as by flogging them and kicking them into obedience.”

Aldous Huxley, quoted by AZspot and cited by Daniel Holter (who are both great). I have never cared for this form of analysis, which establishes a perceiving elect -generally the very educated- as capable of distinguishing ‘authentic’ happiness from suggestible, hypnotized ersatz-happiness. Note the wording: the clever leaders can trick people into “loving” their servitude.

A feat of some skill: the total manipulation of the rebellious, recalcitrant, omnivorously demanding, inconsistent, fickle human species! What brilliance these leaders possess, mastering mass psychology as none ever have from their smoke-filled rooms and lulling us all into our “false” happiness!

And only the hero-savant to tell us: “No, you’re not really happy! You’re not really free! You don’t want what you think you want, love what you think you love! Read my books and learn of your secret slavery!”

It is parlor-game intellectualism; Huxley will always have the trump card: “You only think you’re happy!” But if you have any respect for the individual, for the moral agency of man, you see at once how ludicrously elitist and epistemologically unjustifiable it is. If the individual says he loves his life and is happy, how can we falsify this claim? With Huxley’s aesthetics! “No one could be happy with such a life!”

But democracy means we accept that people are not all pleased by the same things, and Huxley’s vision of profound conditioning is merely a very fancy form of condescension and snobbery: the ordinary man, what a lump of clay his mind is! So easily tricked! And television: what trash!

This is the first step towards tyranny, of course: reduce the individual to the status of a passive and malleable animal. Shall he be rescued from the capitalist democracy he thinks he favors? A revolution may be needed! A war is already underway, it’s just undetected by the sheep! Violence may be required to free humanity, whether they think they’re enslaved or not, whether they want liberating or not!

(See also: A New Nadir’s very good response about Huxley and social criticism in general).

“To think that we could have had an ordinary life with its bickering, broken hearts, and divorces! There are people in the world so crazy as not to realize that such is the normal human existence of the kind everybody should aim at. What wouldn’t we have given for such heartbreaks!”

Nadezhda Mandelstam, widow of the poet Osip Mandelstam, who was arrested and tortured and, in essence, killed by the Soviet State, in her memoir Hope Against Hope. Osip himself noted that

Only in Russia is poetry respected – it gets people killed. Is there anywhere else where poetry is so common a motive for murder?

Such histories can make one despondent, but there is also the consolatory power they posses: what we endure is nothing alongside the anguish of our forebears, and what they endured too pales in comparison to our distant ancestors, and so on.

“We have reason to remark the untractable liberties taken by this member, which intrudes so tiresomely when we do not require it and fails us so annoyingly when we need it most, imperiously pitting its authority against that of the will, and most proudly and obstinately refusing our solicitations both mental and manual.”
Montaigne discussing impotence in his essay “On the Power of the Imagination.” I share this for Nudawn, whose recently-tweeted bon mot will probably come to mind at the worst imaginable time in my future as well as for Raynor Ganan, the Internet’s leading curator of the literarily sexual.
“The roar of traffic… Ceaselessly, in great surges, the waves roll in over the length and breadth of our cities, rising higher and higher, breaking in a kind of frenzy when the roar reaches its peak and then discharging across the stones and the asphalt even as the next onrush is being released from where it was held by the traffic lights. For some time now I have been convinced that it is out of this din that the life is being born which will come after us and will spell our gradual destruction, just as we have been gradually destroying what was there long before us.”

W.G. Sebald, Vertigo. There is a life that we have been destroying: the slowness of the past, the monuments and movements of which seem to have taken an incomprehensible amount of time to unfold, is ontologically unintelligible to us; scale of sufficient magnitude begins to be a difference not of degree but of kind.

We are a life being destroyed: already the teenagers stacked on motorbikes in Beijing, texting as they weave through traffic while chatting and listening to music, cannot understand how it takes us so long to say anything or why we should want a bit of quiet while writing out our over-long notes, some more than 140 characters, to one another.

Sophie Scholl, of the White Rose resistance group; killed February 22, 1943.
Clive James, despite his atheism, wrote that Sophie Scholl “was probably a saint” and compared her to Jesus Christ; her face on German postage stamps is as great a symbol of transformation as Saul’s conversion, a demonstration that neither a state nor a human is ever beyond redemption.
There is some question, however, as to whether every member of our species remains human; in their spellbound, somnambulistic stupor, the Germans of the 1930s and 1940s can be said at the very least to have permitted as inhuman a machine as was imaginable  to assemble itself from their institutions and indeed their very body politic: the infernal Nazi state which defies credulity and has thus become myth. We feel that the Germans, the Wermacht, the Nazis, the Gestapo, must have been monsters, not ordinary typical humans as we are.
Whatever they were, there were few dissenters in their midst; and even if one objected to Nazism, one knew one could do nothing; and had one a family, what would running out into the street to be shot down by the SS as they came to capture one’s neighbor do anyway but assure that one’s child, too, would die in a camp, or at least be orphaned? Against sufficient power, morality is purely sacrificial; even if we can accept this for ourselves, can we accept it on behalf of others who need us?
Perhaps this is why the White Rose was comprised of the young, though not exclusively. A small, hopeless band of Germans who resisted the Nazi regime, they engaged in the simple, chiefly symbolic act of circulating essays which attempted to wake readers from the sociopathic trance in which they seemed to have been lulled by Hitler.

That students, powerless and doubtless aware that they faced assured death were they caught, turned to the essay as a means of protest is significant; they were using the expression of the West’s cultural heritage, its literary and rational tradition, as means to combat the negation of that heritage: irrational authoritarianism:
It is impossible to engage in intellectual discourse with National Socialism because it is not an intellectually defensible program. It is false to speak of a National Socialist philosophy… At its very inception this movement depended on the deception and betrayal of one’s fellow man; even at that time it was inwardly corrupt and could support itself only by constant lies. After all, Hitler states in an early edition of “his” book (a book written in the worst German I have ever read, in spite of the fact that it has been elevated to the position of the Bible in this nation of poets and thinkers): “It is unbelievable, to what extent one must betray a people in order to rule it.”
In their leaflets, which quoted Goethe and Aristotle, they argued both for intellectual resistance and for sabotage, and called attention to the slaughter of the Jews, the Poles, and others, asserting every argument against the Nazi machine they could muster: on theological, practical, political, patriotic, historical, artistic, and moral grounds they fought the lies of propaganda and the delirium of the trance-state.
As they surely knew would happen, they were caught; in 1943, all were arrested by the Gestapo, tried, and executed. There is a great deal more about their story here; it is as moving as anything I know. As one playwright noted:
The fact that [these] little kids, in the mouth of the wolf, where it really counted, had the tremendous courage to do what they did, is spectacular to me. I know that the world is better for them having been there, but I do not know why.
The emphasized last line seems crucial to me; I can only suggest that in their sacrificial courage, their refusal to abrogate their innate moral duty -which tens of millions of their peers had happily neglected-, and their sagacity despite their youth, the White Rose confirm that there was the finest sort of humanity even in the midst of that infernal machine. Maybe it is that they remind us that heroism is possible for all.
(Note: I’d written and abandoned dozens of posts about them several months ago while briefly fixated by ideas about morality, resigning myself to the customary sense of oafishness one feels when speaking of the very precious, but was reminded of them again by the eminent B. Michael’s note about Holland, 1954, a Neutral Milk Hotel song which mentions them. It isn’t surprising that Jeff Mangum alludes to them; one can easily grow as obsessed with the White Rose as with Anne Frank, and I find it hard not to search photos of Sophie Scholl for signs of her core, the source of her heroism, the looming loss).

Sophie Scholl, of the White Rose resistance group; killed February 22, 1943.

Clive James, despite his atheism, wrote that Sophie Scholl “was probably a saint” and compared her to Jesus Christ; her face on German postage stamps is as great a symbol of transformation as Saul’s conversion, a demonstration that neither a state nor a human is ever beyond redemption.

There is some question, however, as to whether every member of our species remains human; in their spellbound, somnambulistic stupor, the Germans of the 1930s and 1940s can be said at the very least to have permitted as inhuman a machine as was imaginable  to assemble itself from their institutions and indeed their very body politic: the infernal Nazi state which defies credulity and has thus become myth. We feel that the Germans, the Wermacht, the Nazis, the Gestapo, must have been monsters, not ordinary typical humans as we are.

Whatever they were, there were few dissenters in their midst; and even if one objected to Nazism, one knew one could do nothing; and had one a family, what would running out into the street to be shot down by the SS as they came to capture one’s neighbor do anyway but assure that one’s child, too, would die in a camp, or at least be orphaned? Against sufficient power, morality is purely sacrificial; even if we can accept this for ourselves, can we accept it on behalf of others who need us?

Perhaps this is why the White Rose was comprised of the young, though not exclusively. A small, hopeless band of Germans who resisted the Nazi regime, they engaged in the simple, chiefly symbolic act of circulating essays which attempted to wake readers from the sociopathic trance in which they seemed to have been lulled by Hitler.

That students, powerless and doubtless aware that they faced assured death were they caught, turned to the essay as a means of protest is significant; they were using the expression of the West’s cultural heritage, its literary and rational tradition, as means to combat the negation of that heritage: irrational authoritarianism:

It is impossible to engage in intellectual discourse with National Socialism because it is not an intellectually defensible program. It is false to speak of a National Socialist philosophy… At its very inception this movement depended on the deception and betrayal of one’s fellow man; even at that time it was inwardly corrupt and could support itself only by constant lies. After all, Hitler states in an early edition of “his” book (a book written in the worst German I have ever read, in spite of the fact that it has been elevated to the position of the Bible in this nation of poets and thinkers): “It is unbelievable, to what extent one must betray a people in order to rule it.”

In their leaflets, which quoted Goethe and Aristotle, they argued both for intellectual resistance and for sabotage, and called attention to the slaughter of the Jews, the Poles, and others, asserting every argument against the Nazi machine they could muster: on theological, practical, political, patriotic, historical, artistic, and moral grounds they fought the lies of propaganda and the delirium of the trance-state.

As they surely knew would happen, they were caught; in 1943, all were arrested by the Gestapo, tried, and executed. There is a great deal more about their story here; it is as moving as anything I know. As one playwright noted:

The fact that [these] little kids, in the mouth of the wolf, where it really counted, had the tremendous courage to do what they did, is spectacular to me. I know that the world is better for them having been there, but I do not know why.

The emphasized last line seems crucial to me; I can only suggest that in their sacrificial courage, their refusal to abrogate their innate moral duty -which tens of millions of their peers had happily neglected-, and their sagacity despite their youth, the White Rose confirm that there was the finest sort of humanity even in the midst of that infernal machine. Maybe it is that they remind us that heroism is possible for all.

(Note: I’d written and abandoned dozens of posts about them several months ago while briefly fixated by ideas about morality, resigning myself to the customary sense of oafishness one feels when speaking of the very precious, but was reminded of them again by the eminent B. Michael’s note about Holland, 1954, a Neutral Milk Hotel song which mentions them. It isn’t surprising that Jeff Mangum alludes to them; one can easily grow as obsessed with the White Rose as with Anne Frank, and I find it hard not to search photos of Sophie Scholl for signs of her core, the source of her heroism, the looming loss).

“The modern conservative is engaged in one of man’s oldest exercises in moral philosophy; that is, the search for a superior moral justification for selfishness.”

J.K. Galbraith, quoted by the excellent Chad and reblogged by many of my absolute favorites, towards whom I mean no disrespect by the following:

I like Galbraith, but this is patently untrue; even if it were the functional outcome of conservative policy, it is no more accurate than saying that “Communists were engaged in one of man’s oldest exercises in moral philosophy; that is, the search for a superior moral justification for killing everyone who doesn’t submit to your rule and many more besides.”

That’s what they wrought, but it’s not what they searched for. The transformation of what we all seek -a better world for ourselves and those we care for- into what we create -a world of faction, discord, exploitation, and needless suffering- is the crucial mystery of human life. Why does all we touch turn to dust?

If one does not understand that those whose beliefs one despises believe them just as one believe one’s own, with the same sense of logical clarity, moral decency, and threatened sensitivity, one does not understand humanity, history, conflict, or even, perhaps, the nature of reason.

For Galbraith to perpetuate the idea that whomever we disagree with we ought to fault for evil intentions or selfishness is odd; I am astonished at the statistically-indefensible reductionism of it. Tens of millions of individuals aggregated into a mass and crushed beneath a patronizing quip, the thrust of which is simple: if you don’t agree with me, it’s because you’re a bad person and your arguments are just pretexts.

I remember when conservatives described anti-war protesters as “America-hating radicals in peace-protester disguise; they want us to lose!” And I recall when any activity against their interests was ascribed by Soviet or American cold warriors to “the subterfuge of the enemy.” It is common enough to deny the agency of disagreeable individual actors and suggest that only the gnosis of the party elite can detect the true (devious and dim) motivations of the automata across the ideological divide. It is common and it is wrong, logically and ethically.

Here is the question one must ask: is it possible to imagine someone with a good heart and a sound or even brilliant mind who disagrees with our political beliefs? If no one with a good heart or mind can disagree with us, why should we permit the enfranchisement of those who disagree? If we know what is right, what principle of pluralism could possibly obstruct our implementation of what is right? This is the justification, of course, which all totalitarians use: why let evil or stupid inferior-types restrain our progress?

If we say that we can imagine such a person -or better, that we know such people, as I do-, we’ll see at once how silly Galbraith is here. (I might add that Galbraith is engaged in an old sort of moral philosophy, too: the ad hominem insulting of opponents to avoid the difficulty of empathy, engagement, and persuasion).

I have known both liberals and conservatives vastly smarter and of better character than I am; I suppose I am lucky for that, or I might be inclined to believe that anyone who doesn’t accept my reasoning is just looking for a fancy disguise for their low immorality. As it is, I must accept the basic proposition of democracy: no man can be said with finality to know what is best, or what is in his peers’ hearts.

(Note: My hero Langer has already responded).

“Were we to describe the so-called “Copernican Revolution” in brief, we might put it this way: predictive power grew ever more irresistible.”

William T. Vollmann, Uncentering the Earth. Vollmann notes that what made the groping progression away from geocentrism (and other errors in astronomy) inevitable was less that they were not explanatory -they were, and worked with our metaphysics at the time!- but that they were not predictive.

Walker Percy felt this was a major element of the paradigmatic shift to what he called “scientism” in the West: as technology has become the most important concern of our civilization, the predictive capacity of any system of knowledge has become how we judge that system’s value. Technology needs theories that can predict how it can relate to and dominate the natural world: so what tells us what will happen is more important than anything else told.

Science has supremely powerful predictive capacities; it has very powerful explanatory capacities, although those explanations must necessarily be developed in inhuman language; it has virtually no capacity for generating human meaning. That is: it is observational, predictive, explanatory only in the ways dictated by the natural world’s contours.

Culture (religion, art, politics) has less powerful predictive capabilities (most believers will admit that its predictions are either eschatological or vague: this will happen to you at the end of time; this will happen after death; but nothing about what will happen to you if you inhale this or that bacteria or travel at a speed approaching that of light; and its predictions do not expand and refine themselves). Culture is better at providing morality and meaning, however, because it can exist apart from the natural world in the world of the mind and heart and in the language of human experience.

I note this only because I found Vollmann’s condensation fascinating: here is the point in which our obsession with understanding and predicting phenomena -with mastering the natural world and the future- begins to supersede our adherence to value systems of another sort.

“Predictive power grew ever more irresistible…” sounds almost Faustian. And perhaps it is.

The ruins of the oldest monastery in the Western world, destroyed by allied bombing during the Battle of Monte Cassino.
The novelist Walter Miller, who participated in the destruction of the abbey where St. Benedict first organized monastic life in 524 CE, despaired for the rest of his life over our tendency to grind into dust all that we cherish with our periodic wars and our ever-advancing technology. In addition to writing the remarkable A Canticle for Leibowitz, Miller practiced Catholicism for many years, and his novel proposes that the role of religion is to preserve the human -the individual- from the indifferent tyranny of history, politics, and “just” wars. That religion is often part of history, politics, and wars is a problem of its practitioners. Miller opposed, then committed, suicide: another illustration of the tensions between belief and practice, tragic and archetypal.
Whether wars are just or not is an unanswerable question; every war is just to some participants, unjust to others, and a catastrophe for all, whether they know it or not. This is neither to say that no wars should be fought or that all wars are equally justifiable; it is merely a fact that all humans believe in their moral code, will kill for it even, and do not care in the inevitable conflicts about the opposing moral codes of their enemies (which they will accuse of incoherence, disingenuousness, or brutality but which are no less felt). Everyone can be given a hypothetical to which they will answer: “Yes, kill, kill!”
All there is to say about war is that we are sorry that history and circumstance and the deeds of the dead place us in opposition to one another, that our memories of slaughtered kin compel us to seek revenge, that it is impossible to establish the point at which the acts of entities like armies and governments can be repaid on individuals, that this world has innumerable conflicts without solutions and that history says only power resolves these by annihilating disagreement, and that our nature ensures all this more or less in perpetuity.
The destruction of the abbey turned out to have been a mistake, an unnecessary poetic flourish to a forgotten part of World War II. As with most mistakes, it tells more about us than the well-executed parts of our hideous plans:

While the original manuscripts and rare artifacts were safely removed from the site, there were several sick and bed-ridden monks and nuns who remained in the monastery. Several of the healthier nuns refused to leave the bedsides of the sick unless they too could be removed. After very limited, unsuccessful attempts by German officers to have the healthier nuns evacuate, German forces retreated down the north side of the mountain late on May 11, leaving the ill nuns in the complex. Several Catholic German soldiers protested this order, but it was ironically a 36-year old Lutheran Obergefreiter of the German 305th Infantry Division, 305th Artillery Regiment who defied the order to abandon the nuns. Eugen Schmid of Stuttgart, a veteran of the Battle of Stalingrad who was one of the few surviving members of the 305th to return to action, told his superior officers that he could not in good conscience let the ill nuns succumb to bombing. German officers refused to give Schmid any motorized equipment or personnel assistance, telling him that he would undertake the operation solo and at his own risk. At around 0100 on May 12, Schmid borrowed a rickety, wooden cart and horse from a nearby farmer and defiantly organized a squad of mostly privates to accompany him to the monastery. Once at the top, Schmid pleaded with the nuns to come, telling them that he brought a cart to evacuate the ill monks and nuns, along with each of the attending nuns. Schmid and his team carried the ill nuns and monks to the cart. They slowly started down the mountain, reaching the north side of Monte Cassino by around 0700 on May 12. Schmid was given no decorations by German authorities for his daring rescue, but received a centuries-old, gold medal bearing the likeness of St. Benedict from the Mother Superior of Monte Cassino, who placed the medal around his neck and said a short prayer with him and his volunteers. She wished for them health and safety, and that they each return home with God’s will and with the praise and thanks of each of the nuns and brothers of Monte Cassino.

There were doubtless other acts of heroism, of decency across national, ethnic, and linguistic lines, and of sacrifice beyond that compelled by hatred and strife. There was also a bear…

The ruins of the oldest monastery in the Western world, destroyed by allied bombing during the Battle of Monte Cassino.

The novelist Walter Miller, who participated in the destruction of the abbey where St. Benedict first organized monastic life in 524 CE, despaired for the rest of his life over our tendency to grind into dust all that we cherish with our periodic wars and our ever-advancing technology. In addition to writing the remarkable A Canticle for Leibowitz, Miller practiced Catholicism for many years, and his novel proposes that the role of religion is to preserve the human -the individual- from the indifferent tyranny of history, politics, and “just” wars. That religion is often part of history, politics, and wars is a problem of its practitioners. Miller opposed, then committed, suicide: another illustration of the tensions between belief and practice, tragic and archetypal.

Whether wars are just or not is an unanswerable question; every war is just to some participants, unjust to others, and a catastrophe for all, whether they know it or not. This is neither to say that no wars should be fought or that all wars are equally justifiable; it is merely a fact that all humans believe in their moral code, will kill for it even, and do not care in the inevitable conflicts about the opposing moral codes of their enemies (which they will accuse of incoherence, disingenuousness, or brutality but which are no less felt). Everyone can be given a hypothetical to which they will answer: “Yes, kill, kill!”

All there is to say about war is that we are sorry that history and circumstance and the deeds of the dead place us in opposition to one another, that our memories of slaughtered kin compel us to seek revenge, that it is impossible to establish the point at which the acts of entities like armies and governments can be repaid on individuals, that this world has innumerable conflicts without solutions and that history says only power resolves these by annihilating disagreement, and that our nature ensures all this more or less in perpetuity.

The destruction of the abbey turned out to have been a mistake, an unnecessary poetic flourish to a forgotten part of World War II. As with most mistakes, it tells more about us than the well-executed parts of our hideous plans:

While the original manuscripts and rare artifacts were safely removed from the site, there were several sick and bed-ridden monks and nuns who remained in the monastery. Several of the healthier nuns refused to leave the bedsides of the sick unless they too could be removed. After very limited, unsuccessful attempts by German officers to have the healthier nuns evacuate, German forces retreated down the north side of the mountain late on May 11, leaving the ill nuns in the complex. Several Catholic German soldiers protested this order, but it was ironically a 36-year old Lutheran Obergefreiter of the German 305th Infantry Division, 305th Artillery Regiment who defied the order to abandon the nuns. Eugen Schmid of Stuttgart, a veteran of the Battle of Stalingrad who was one of the few surviving members of the 305th to return to action, told his superior officers that he could not in good conscience let the ill nuns succumb to bombing. German officers refused to give Schmid any motorized equipment or personnel assistance, telling him that he would undertake the operation solo and at his own risk. At around 0100 on May 12, Schmid borrowed a rickety, wooden cart and horse from a nearby farmer and defiantly organized a squad of mostly privates to accompany him to the monastery. Once at the top, Schmid pleaded with the nuns to come, telling them that he brought a cart to evacuate the ill monks and nuns, along with each of the attending nuns. Schmid and his team carried the ill nuns and monks to the cart. They slowly started down the mountain, reaching the north side of Monte Cassino by around 0700 on May 12. Schmid was given no decorations by German authorities for his daring rescue, but received a centuries-old, gold medal bearing the likeness of St. Benedict from the Mother Superior of Monte Cassino, who placed the medal around his neck and said a short prayer with him and his volunteers. She wished for them health and safety, and that they each return home with God’s will and with the praise and thanks of each of the nuns and brothers of Monte Cassino.

There were doubtless other acts of heroism, of decency across national, ethnic, and linguistic lines, and of sacrifice beyond that compelled by hatred and strife. There was also a bear

The Fugue of The Twentieth Century

I happened onto Butterfly Effect’s comments about Skylab and later saw Unburying the Lead’s photo of Europa and wound up, as we do here in the inter-ether, reading article after hyperlinked article in a cascade of tabs, each more interesting then the last.

Space exploration is fascinating in an ordinary sense, of course, but it is also serves as a kind of nexus for the intersection of the forces that defined the last sixty years. Indeed, in its colossal synthesis of military culture and technology, the tension between pure science and economically-driven “research and development,” and the shifting relations between Nazi Germany, the USSR, and the US, space exploration is almost a fugue of the themes of the 20th century. So dense is its history with the reverberations of our modernism, our utopianism, our bloodiness, our nationalism, our ideological exceptionalism, and the color, texture, sound, and inner sense of our experiences after WWI that it’s almost as though it were created to encapsulate the period: it is an incidental monument.

There were Operations Paperclip and Overcast, in which the US secreted from defeated Germany the scientists, some Nazis, who engineered the V2 and who would go on to direct our own weapons and space programs (already competing with the USSR): a perfect distillation of the decline of nationalism and the rise of the post-nationalist technocracy, the bureaucratization of the world, the utilitarian half-morality of foreign policy.

There were the anonymous and grisly deaths of an unknown number of cosmonauts, which constituted an unacceptable flaw to the perfect dogmatists who controlled their society and were thus hidden away. We wiped the blood off of the machines so that they would shine in the flashbulb photographs. And our own astronauts: ideal men of the military placed into a superstructure of scientism and archetypal heroism working for reformed National Socialists to beat the Russians and make space safe in billion-dollar rockets built by Lockheed.

There is above all the arc of our interests and habits  in the passing years: the unalloyed idealism of early NASA missions and the Apollo program with its Kennedy associations leading to indirection in the 1970s, with muddles like Skylab, to the more contemporary world of the newscycle: tragedy (and science vs. government), triumph, repeat, evolve.

Novels written with this much symbolic resonance are rare (I think of Vollman’s Europe Central).

(Note: I’m not even mentioning the absurd biographies of ordinary astronauts like this man, who’s already lived more than I would in ten lifetimes; or the intersection of the space and atomic programs; or the way that the deeds of governments and militaries and corporations take place high above us, rotating and repeating and shimmering, forever in view and out of reach; or anything else that would further prolong this drivel, for which I now apologize).

The Judgment of the Past by the Present

It is perhaps obvious how indebted I am to Milan Kundera for my political and artistic sensibilities; as often as I mention Errol Morris (thanks, Riaz!), it is Kundera who has primacy among my influences and for whom I have the most affection.

On a day when, as Doree noted, he has been implicated as a one-time informer (in 1950, when he was 21), I was heartened to see quoted by Bunnynico a passage from my favorite of his works, Immortality. She relates the following quote to our American election:

Of course, imagologues existed long before they created the powerful institutions we know today. Even Hitler had his personal imagologue, who used to stand in front of him and patiently demonstrate the gestures to be made during speeches to fascinate the crowds. But if that imagologue, in an interview with the press, had amused the Germans by describing Hitler as incapable of moving his hands, he would not have survived his indiscretion by more than a few hours. Nowadays, however, the imagologue not only does not try to hide his activity, but often even speaks for his politician clients, explains to the public what he taught them to do or not to do, how he told them to behave, what formula they are likely to use, and what tie they are likely to wear. We needn’t be surprised by this self-confidence: in the last few decades, imagology has gained a historic victory over ideology.(….)Public opinion polls are the critical instrument of imagology’s power, because they enable imagology to live in absolute harmony with the people. The imagologue bombards people with questions: how is the French economy prospering? is there racism in France? is racism good or bad? who is the greatest writer of all time? is Hungary in Europe or Polynesia? which world politician is the sexiest? And since for contemporary man reality is a continent visited less and less often and, besides, justifiably disliked, the findings of polls have become the truth. Public opinion polls are a parliament in permanent session, whose function is to create truth, the most democratic truth that has ever existed. Because it will never be at variance with the parliament of truth, the power of imagologues will always live in truth, and although I know that everything human is mortal, I cannot imagine anything that could break this power.

Bunnynico has more very interesting analysis on these ideas here, and links to an article called Milan Kundera and Image. I consider his commentary on politics and media to be of tremendous value and quite accurate in their assessment; as I’ve expressed, I believe it is image (or we might say “the personal” or “the demographic-aesthetic”) that is responsible for almost all “political” beliefs.

But I want to mention something else: if you’ve read Kundera, you are familiar with his utter hostility to (1) the reduction of artists to their biographies, which he considers not merely a useless form of analysis for art but in fact one that misleads and distorts and (2) the judgment of the past by the present.

This latter phenomenon is perpetual and embarrassing: we are so happy to condemn those whose historical context was to them the fluid and impossible terrain of the present, but is to us the exposed and dissected landscape of the textbook. As Kundera once wrote, man proceeds through life as though walking down a path in the fog. He can see perhaps a few steps ahead of himself, and a bit to the woods on either side, but not more. When we look back on him, we see only the path and never the fog. It is all so clear!

Perhaps these themes interested him because he knew that in his early, revolutionary youth –at a time when most of our intellectual heroes were enthusiastically embracing murderous cretins like Stalin, Mao, and Che– he stumbled on his path. Or perhaps his interest was merely that of the artist: generalized, human, investigative.

Kundera never speaks to the press, but he’s spoken about this to emphatically deny it. My affection for his work biases me, so I offer no conclusion. I think, however, that we ought to remember the fog of the time, the youth of the man, and the impossibly inertial forces of history, which have now reached across fifty-eight years to grasp at an artist who’s spent his life fleeing them.

KB posted this photo:
“The Valley of the Shadow of Death,” as photographed by Roger Fenton in 1855. As the spent cannonballs attest, the Plain was the location of the Crimean War and the legendary charge of the Light Brigade.
Errol Morris, to me one of the great artists of our time, has a prolix blog at the New York Times called Zoom, which tends to discuss the manipulation of truth through representational media (for example, he wrote at length about the infamous instance of Iran using the Photoshop cloning tool to alter the photo of their missiles).
He started the blog by discussing about the Fenton photograph above, and in typical fashion wound up writing three extraordinarily long articles, replete with digressions about Fenton, the war, photographic development, and more.
His interests: did Fenton, as is commonly assumed now, place the canon balls on the road? Is this photograph “staged”? What does it mean to “stage” a photograph? His investigation is exhaustive, but truly brilliant, and his conclusions were notable to me.
If you’re into questions about media, representation, war, and history -and given the present conditions of the state and its news apparatus one should be- it’s fascinating. It has the trademark of all of Morris’ work: it demonstrates the fallibility of analysis, the eagerness of the knowledgeable to judge, and how persistently wrong we are about everything.

KB posted this photo:

“The Valley of the Shadow of Death,” as photographed by Roger Fenton in 1855. As the spent cannonballs attest, the Plain was the location of the Crimean War and the legendary charge of the Light Brigade.

Errol Morris, to me one of the great artists of our time, has a prolix blog at the New York Times called Zoom, which tends to discuss the manipulation of truth through representational media (for example, he wrote at length about the infamous instance of Iran using the Photoshop cloning tool to alter the photo of their missiles).

He started the blog by discussing about the Fenton photograph above, and in typical fashion wound up writing three extraordinarily long articles, replete with digressions about Fenton, the war, photographic development, and more.

His interests: did Fenton, as is commonly assumed now, place the canon balls on the road? Is this photograph “staged”? What does it mean to “stage” a photograph? His investigation is exhaustive, but truly brilliant, and his conclusions were notable to me.

If you’re into questions about media, representation, war, and history -and given the present conditions of the state and its news apparatus one should be- it’s fascinating. It has the trademark of all of Morris’ work: it demonstrates the fallibility of analysis, the eagerness of the knowledgeable to judge, and how persistently wrong we are about everything.

Tags: history art
“In Plato’s Phaedrus, Socrates bemoaned the development of writing. He feared that, as people came to rely on the written word as a substitute for the knowledge they used to carry inside their heads, they would…“cease to exercise their memory and become forgetful.” And because they would be able to “receive a quantity of information without proper instruction,” they would “be thought very knowledgeable when they are for the most part quite ignorant.” They would be “filled with the conceit of wisdom instead of real wisdom.”
Nicholas Carr. I think most already read this surprisingly excellent article, but I think it’s useful to remember how repetitive human history is. New technologies are always critiqued for their effects on the mind, on our mental and social habits; sometimes, these criticisms are even accurate, but it’s wasted breath nevertheless.